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Fears have abounded for years that the sweet spot for capture of regula-
tory agencies is the "revolving door" whereby civil servants migrate from
their roles as regulators to private industry. Recent scholarship on this topic
has examined whether America's watchdog for securities markets, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is hobbled by the long-standing
practices of its enforcement staff exiting their jobs at the Commission and
migrating to lucrative private sector employment where they represent those
they once regulated. The research to date has been inconclusive on whether
staff revolving door practices have weakened the SEC's verve. In this
Article, we offer a different perspective on the source of risks of the SEC's
capture as a consequence of revolving door practices. We focus on all the
key divisions of the SEC, not just its Division of Enforcement, and we exam-
ine the individuals who lead the staff and set its agenda.
We find that the SEC's day-to-day work is highly collaborative and
staff output is subject to review at multiple levels. These characteristics
greatly reduce the likelihood of staff rent-seeking. On the other hand,
agenda setting and the shaping of the discourse around regulatory and
enforcement objectives is very much subject to individual action by SEC
officials that lead the five main operations of the SEC. We therefore focus
our discussion of revolving door concerns on SEC directors.
Here we show a disquieting departure in the last thirty years from
practices that prevailed at the SEC during its first half century of existence:
whereas SEC division heads through the early 1980's were, with very few
exceptions, regularly internally promoted from the staff, this practice sharply
ended in the late 1990s when division directors began to be recruited with
increasing frequency from the private sector. In addition to documenting
this development, we explore the likely causes for this sharp change in
selecting senior leadership at the SEC as well as exploring the benefits,
costs, and fears of this significant change in practice. We conclude by offer-
ing strategies that could be pursued to moderate any such risk of capture.
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INTRODUCTION
There has long been fear of industry capture of regulatory bodies. The theoretical
basis for such fear is built on public choice theory, which holds that regulators seek
to maximize their own level of political support rather than seeking to advance
some notion that their action creates a public good. Pursuant to this view, agency
personnel seek to maximize their personal utility and not that of the more distant
and diffuse public interest; it is argued they do this through regulatory and enforce-
ment choices that favor the regulated.2 In other words, regulators make choices that
benefit themselves and correlatively favor the regulated rather than those they are
charged to protect 3-this is the natural economic consequence of the group to be
regulated being not only better organized, but better able to provide the rewards
regulators seek. This process is normally referred to as the "capture" hypothesis.4
For years, fears have abounded that the sweet spot for capture of regulatory
agencies is the "revolving door" whereby civil servants migrate from their roles
1. See Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1270-75 (2015).
2. Some commentators have "strongly disagreed" with this view. See, e.g., ROBERTA S. KARMEL,
REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 83 (1982) ("The so-called revolving door, by which individuals pass
from private enterprise into the government, and from public service into private business, provides a
constant renewal of talent for both sectors.").
3. See generally Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. EcoN. POL'Y 203
(2006) (providing a detailed survey of the various models of regulatory capture). For a similar survey of
regulatory capture theory within the context of the SEC, see generally Zheng, supra note 1, at 1270-75
("This exchange relationship between the demander and supplier of regulation forms the central critique
of the regulatory process by George Stigler and other members of the public choice school, which has
become the most notable strand of the capture theories.").
4. See generally William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995) (providing a summary of much
of this literature).
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as regulators to private industry. Recent scholarship on this topic has examined
whether America's watchdog for securities markets, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), is hobbled by the long-standing practices of its enforcement
staff exiting their jobs at the Commission and migrating to lucrative private-
sector employment where they represent those they once regulated. The research
to date has been inconclusive as to whether such revolving door practices have
weakened the SEC's verve.
This Article offers a different perspective on whether the risks of capturing the
SEC can be traced to revolving door practices. Our perspective is broader than prior
studies because we focus on all key divisions of the SEC, not just its Division of
Enforcement. Most significantly, our focus is not at the staff level, but rather on the
individuals who supervise the staff and set the agenda for the division.
As developed below, the SEC's day-to-day work is often highly collaborative:
staff output is not only subject to review but to review at multiple levels. It is our
view that, in combination, these characteristics greatly reduce the likelihood of
repeated-or for that matter isolated-instances of staff rent-seeking; we view
these overlooked features of how the SEC functions as an important bulwark
against staff sacrificing the public interest so as to win a lucrative position in the
private sector. On the other hand, agenda-setting and the shaping of the discourse
around regulatory and enforcement objectives is subject to individual action by
SEC officials who lead the SEC's five main operations. We therefore focus our
discussion of revolving door concerns on SEC directors.
Here, we show a disquieting departure in the last thirty years from practices that
prevailed at the SEC during the first half-century of its existence. Indeed, through
the early 1980s, SEC division heads were, with few exceptions (most notably the
SEC's general counsel), regularly selected from the staff. This practice ended in
the late 1990s, when division directors began to be recruited with increasing fre-
quency from the private sector. In addition to documenting this development, we
explore the likely causes for this sharp change in selecting the senior leadership at
the SEC; the benefits, costs, and fears of this significant change in practice; and
strategies that could be pursued to moderate any such risk of capture.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
In recent years, the revolving door phenomenon-where attorneys transition
between positions at the SEC and positions in private practice-has become com-
monplace.6 Many times, an attorney will leave the SEC for the private sector
5. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Enforcement Attorneys: Should I Stay or Should I Go?
(N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-07, 2017), http://repository.1aw.
umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1238&context=lawecon_current [https://perma.cc/782W-
6WYD].
6. See Tom McGinty, SEC Lawyer One Day, Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2010, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303450704575160043010579272 [https://perma.
cc/9LV3-V7GV] (discussing how former SEC employees leave the agency for private practice).
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where she represents clients in the very same industry that the agency regulates.
This door works in both directions: young attorneys frequently transition back
into private practice after working at the SEC for a few years, but established
attorneys, often with deep ties to Wall Street, regularly accept top positions at the
SEC as political appointees. This dynamic has not gone unobserved by critics,
particularly in light of the heightened scrutiny placed on the SEC in the wake of
the financial crisis. 9 In fact, some commentators in both academia and the media
have expressed grave concern over the impact that this movement has on SEC
enforcement.o Others have not been as quick to condemn the revolving door, opt-
ing instead to emphasize how the movement between the public and private sec-
tors may actually improve SEC enforcement and policy."
Many view the tenure of former SEC Chair Mary Jo White as the paradigmatic
example of the revolving door. 12 Before being nominated to the SEC, White had
transitioned back and forth between the private and public sectors.13 She had
alternated between employment as a private defense attorney at the law firm
Debevoise & Plimpton, where her clients included prominent financial institu-
tions and their executives, and employment as a prosecutor in both the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York. 14 During her time as Chair of the SEC, White
7. See id. (describing various instances in which former SEC employees began to represent clients in
matters regarding SEC enforcement, sometimes within days of leaving the agency).
8. The SEC's administration is overseen by its chair who is one of five commissioners appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L.
No. 73-291, § 4,48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)); see Michael Lewis &
David Einhom, Opinion, How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 3, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhornb.html?pagewanted=3&em [https://nyti.ms/
2mxlWX6J] (calling to "close the revolving door between the [SEC] and Wall Street," but arguing to
"keep the door open the other way" to fill the SEC with "experienced, respected investors").
9. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Revolving Door at S.E.C. is Hurdle to Crisis Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2011, 9:54 PM) https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO5E6DAI 13E
F931A3575BCOA9679D8B63 [https://nyti.ms/2AblHqg] (acknowledging that "the revolving door [has
been] such a dominant fact about the S.E.C.'s culture" for some time, but recent events have "raise[d]
questions about the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street at a time when public distrust
about the agency and its lack of enforcement action against the culprits of the crisis is running high").
10. See Peter J. Henning, The Revolving Door and S.E.C. Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Apr. 8, 2010, 3:07 PM) https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/the-revolving-door-and-s-e-c-
enforcement/ [https://nyti.ms/2DvnZ5x] (discussing how news reports have "raise[d] questions about
the effectiveness of the enforcement division at the Securities and Exchange Commission").
11. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 517
(arguing that the revolving door may incentivize government officials to do a better job and exploring
the legal challenges of trying to close the door).
12. See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Mary Jo White Spins the SEC's Revolving Door, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
17, 2013, 6:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-03-17/mary-jo-white-spins-the-
sec-s-revolving-door [https://perma.cc/URC2-W7WM] (discussing the potential conflicts that Mary Jo
White will face as Chair of the SEC).
13. See Dina ElBoghdady, Mary Jo White Faces No Opposition at SEC Confirmation Hearing,
WASH. PosT (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/mary-jo-white-faces-
no-opposition-at-sec-confirmation-hearing/2013/03/12/812608ac-8b39-1 1e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_story.
html?utmterm=.d9bcfef34929 [https://perma.cc/8DFR-TFSH] (discussing how senators saw White's
employment experience as beneficial during the nomination process).
14. See id.
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was forced to recuse herself in more than four dozen cases involving either her
previous firm or previous clients, or in cases involving the law firm at which her
husband worked." Some have argued that these recusals had the effect of "delay-
ing settlements and opening the door, in at least one case, to a lighter punish-
ment."16 Almost immediately after White's departure from the SEC in January,
2017, she announced that she would return to Debevoise & Plimpton.1 7
Another example commonly cited when discussing the impact of the revolving
door is the SEC commissioners' failure to support then-Chair Mary Schapiro's
money market fund initiative-a failure characterized by another former SEC
Chair, Arthur Levitt, as a "national disgrace." 8 In 2012, Schapiro proposed a
money market fund initiative that she believed would minimize the susceptibility
of these institutions to runs.19 That reform effort was dropped after three commis-
sioners had informed her that they would not support the reform.20 Critics of the
revolving door attribute the initiative's failure to the efforts of various SEC
alumni who were working as industry lobbyists at the time.21 It cannot ultimately
be determined if the initiative failed due to the influence of the revolving door or
15. Peter Eavis & Ben Protess, She Runs S.E.C. He's a Lawyer. Recusals and Headaches Ensue.,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 23, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/business/dealbook/sec-
hamstrung-by-its-leaders-legal-ties.html [https://nyti.ms/1BgJ3H1] ("In the nearly two years since Ms.
White took over the agency, she has had to recuse herself from more than four dozen enforcement
investigations, the interviews and records show, sometimes delaying settlements and opening the door,
in at least one case, to a lighter punishment.").
16. Id. Aside from the recusals, Ms. White's tenure was not otherwise free from controversy. In fact,
Senator Elizabeth Warren openly criticized the regulator and even publicly called for White's
termination by President Barack Obama. See Andrew Ackerman, Elizabeth Warren to Obama: Fire
SEC Chief Mary Jo White, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2016, 6:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
elizabeth-warren-to-obama-fire-sec-chief-mary-jo-white-1476439200 [https://perma.cc/8Y6R-MY8R]
(discussing Senator Warren's actions).
17. Elizabeth Olson, Mary Jo White to Rejoin Debevoise & Plimpton, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Feb.
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/business/dealbook/mary-jo-white-debevoise-plimpton.
html [https://nyti.ms/21koeaH]. Indeed, controversy surrounds her return to private practice because when
asked during her confirmation to become chair of the SEC she stated it was her intent to retire following
service at the SEC. Pam Martens & Russ Martens, Mary Jo White Seriously Misled the U.S. Senate to
Become SEC Chair, WALL ST. ON PARADE (Feb. 16, 2017), http://wallstreetonparade.com/2017/02/mary-
jo-white-seriously-misled-the-u-s-senate-to-become-sec-chair/ [https://perma.cc/89U7-NL3L].
18. Laura Marcinek & Tom Keene, Levitt Says SEC Money-Fund Punt a 'National Disgrace,'
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2012, 1:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-23/levitt-says-sec-
inaction-on-funds-national-disgrace-tom-keene.html/ [https://perma.cc/R62T-MCRZ].
19. Press Release, Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Money Market
Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-166htm [https://
perma.cc/MK6M-B77S] (describing the aim of the reform).
20. See id. (explaining why Schapiro chose to abandon the initiative).
21. See MICHAEL SMALLBERG, PROJECT ON Gov'T OVERSIGHT, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING
DOOR AT SEC CREATES RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 3 (2013), http://pogoarchives.org/ebooks/
20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolving-door.pdf ("Many of the people who lobbied the SEC on
this issue on behalf of the investment industry had traveled a familiar path: they once worked at the SEC
but had gone through the revolving door to join the industry.").
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to some other factor, but the incident certainly increased awareness of the connec-
tion between the SEC and Wall Street.22
Several highly publicized events have drawn further attention to the revolving
door. In recent years, we have seen the exposure of two elaborate Ponzi schemes.
Some claim that the revolving door contributed to the failure of the SEC to detect
the schemes of Bernard Madoff and Allen Stanford because former SEC employ-
ees represented both individuals.23 In the aftermath of the Madoff scheme,
Michael Lewis and David Einhom penned an op-ed piece in The New York Times
that questioned why the SEC failed to uncover the scheme despite the presence of
multiple warning flags. 24 The authors cited the SEC's revolving door as one of
the contributing factors to the failure, writing, "If you work for the enforcement
division of the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the
front too, that if you maintain good relations with Wall Street you might soon be
paid huge sums of money to be employed by it." 25 Therefore, the familiar capture
narrative asserts that actions by the SEC's staff are shaped by the incentive to
"curry favor" and appeal to the "Wall Street elite." 26
Others, however, are skeptical of Lewis and Einhom's treatment of Wall Street
as one "monolithic," responsive entity.2 7 Instead, they question whether there
would have been any negative impact on the future career prospects of SEC
employees in exposing Madoff, or if those incentives were driving the investiga-
tion in the first place.28 Indeed, we can easily surmise that a staff attorney's career
is more likely advanced by successfully prosecuting Madoff and other violators
22. Although this revolving door phenomenon is not unique to the SEC, some have suggested that the
agency is particularly susceptible to disproportionate influence from its former employees. See Henning,
supra note 10 ("Yet, the perception is that the S.E.C. may be more prone to responding favorably to
entreaties from its former staff. While decision making in the Justice Department tends to be diffuse,
most S.E.C. enforcement decisions ultimately are approved in Washington, so that is usually the focus
for lobbying efforts.").
23. Zaring, supra note 11, at 509 ("The revolving door has been blamed for the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) failure to catch Ponzi schemers such as Bernard Madoff and R. Allen
Stanford, both of whom were represented by former SEC officials while they carried out their frauds.").
24. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World as We Know It, N.Y. TvIEs
(Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhom.html [https://nyti.ms/
21JvBZ1]. Cited among the warning signs is the report penned by Harry Markopolos (former investment
officer with Rampart Investment Management) that was sent to the SEC in 2005. Id. Markopolos
advanced two explanations for Mr. Madoff's profits: he was either "front-running" his customers or his
investment model was a Ponzi scheme. Id. As an additional warning sign, Goldman Sachs had refused to
do business with Madoff prior to the uncovering of the scheme. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. ("A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that the whole point of landing the job
as the S.E.C.'s director of enforcement is to position oneself for the better paying one on Wall Street.").
27. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a
Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 905-06 ("The disconnect in the Lewis-Einhorn story, surprisingly, is
that they treat 'Wall Street' as monolithic, an assembly of the economic gods that is either angry or
pleased by what the regulators do. In fact, within the investment community there are nasty rivalries and
dramatically differing interests, with some segments liking nothing more than aggressive regulation that
hurts their competitors or counterparties more than themselves.").
28. See id. at 905 ("Put simply, I can't imagine that the future careers of anyone at the SEC would
have been hurt by exposing him as a fraud. Quite the contrary, I suspect.").
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than by slothfulness. The former signals qualities valued in labor markets,
whereas the latter is not prized by prospective employers.
Another situation that drew attention to the revoling door phenomenon was the
exposure of false accounting practices at Deutsche Bank during the financial cri-
sis.29 Eric Ben-Artzi, former risk officer at Deutsche, refused the monetary
reward offered to him for uncovering the fraud. In a bold public statement,30
explaining his rejection of the substantial reward, he took issue with the SEC's
decision to pursue only Deutsche Bank and to not prosecute the executives
involved with the violation.3 1 In his statement, he raised concern that the SEC's
decision was the product of revolving door practices, observing how "top SEC
lawyers had held senior posts at the bank, moving in and out of top positions at
the regulator even as the investigations into malfeasance at Deutsche were
ongoing." 32 Although Ben-Artzi acknowledged that he could not be certain that
the revolving door was the reason the SEC chose not to pursue civil enforcement
actions against the executives, he asserted that there was enough potential conflict
present to cast doubt on the investigation. 33 In particular, Ben-Artzi questioned
whether the recusal of Robert Rice, Chief Counsel to Chair Mary Jo White, from
the investigation was sufficient to remove this conflict.3 4 Before assuming his
position in the Chair's office, where his duties included advice on enforcement
strategies, Rice was a lead counsel for Deutsche Bank where he specialized in
regulatory and governance matters before joining the SEC in the midst of the
ongoing investigation.3 5
Such headline-grabbing events certainly have spurred debate regarding the
revolving door at the SEC. Although many acknowledge the existence of move-
ment between the SEC and private practice, the precise impact and desirability of
29. See Tom Braithwaite & Kara Scannell, Deutsche Bank Fined for Misstating Value of Derivatives,
FIN. TIMES (May 26, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/f9d4d8e8-03b2-11e5-b55e-00144feabdcO
[https://perma.cc/FF4R-LAKQ] (describing the scandal and resulting SEC action).
30. See Gabe Friedman, Whistleblower Decries Revolving Door Between SEC and Deutsche Bank,
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RS5R-HH3Y] (reacting to the refusal).
31. Guy Rolnik, SEC and Revolving Doors: Q&A with Eric Ben-Artzi, the Deutsche Bank
Whistleblower Who Rejected a Multimillion Dollar Award, PROMARKET (Aug. 29, 2016), https://
promarket.org/sec-revolving-doors-qa-eric-ben-artzi-12-billion-dollar-deutsche-whistleblower/ [https://
perma.cc/9NEV-XFKJ] ("In fact I think that bringing civil charges against the executives would be a
higher deterrent than the criminal deterrent because it's so hard to bring criminal cases against these
executives apparently." (quoting Eric Ben-Artzi)).
32. Eric Ben-Artzi, We Must Protect Shareholders from Executive Wrongdoing, FIN-. TIMES (Aug. 18,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b43d2d96-652a-11e6-8310-ecfbddad227 [https://perma.cc/3W4B-
SAA2].
33. See Rolnik, supra note 31 ("Yes, admittedly I expressed it as a concern rather than as a fact that I
know, because I don't know it for a fact. I don't have direct proof, but there is so much smoke there."
(quoting Eric Ben-Artzi)).
34. See id. ("It's clear that when your boss' boss' boss is potentially one of the people who are being
accused, I don't see how you could really make reasonable ... how you could be considered to be a
prosecutor who's really trying to bring a case." (quoting Eric Ben-Artzi)).
35. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Robert E. Rice, Chief Counsel to SEC Chair, to
Leave SEC (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-17.html [https://perma.cc/
MU9R-68AC] (describing Rice's employment history).
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the revolving door remains unclear.3 6 In discussing the impact of the revolving
door on SEC enforcement, many broad accusations of regulatory capture are
made without much concrete evidence for support. Additionally, hardly any
attention has been devoted to how the revolving door impacts top officials, as
opposed to lower level staffers at the SEC. Therefore, the question of exactly
how the revolving door impacts the SEC remains still unresolved. We next sum-
marize the literature on competing theoretical efforts to explain the revolving
door.
II. THEORETICAL ATTEMPTS AT EXPLAINING THE REVOLVING DOOR
A threshold question in examining the revolving door is, why do some attor-
neys choose to enter the private sector while others pursue careers in public serv-
ice? Even more precisely, why do private-sector employees want to work at the
SEC? Multiple scholars have attempted to model the private- versus public-sector
choice. For example, based on his job choice model that focused on wage differ-
entials, Burton Weisbrod concluded that "those lawyers who choose public inter-
est work have different 'preferences' from those who choose private law
practices." 37 Weisbrod acknowledged that the choice to enter the public sector is
partially impacted by an attorney's "nonpecuniary" preferences.38 Using this
model, Choi and Pritchard theorized that attorneys might choose to work at an
agency like the SEC to satisfy their inherent preference for a career in public serv-
ice, perhaps "enjoying the opportunity to wear the 'white hat. "'9
John Goddeeris extended Weisbrod's model to account not only for nonpe-
cuniary preferences, but also the difference in an attorney's potential earnings
between the public and private sectors.40 By accounting for the potential wage
differential, Goddeeris tried to control for self-selection into the private sector.41
The results of the model reaffirmed the claim that "preferences for public-interest
work are related to personal characteristics. "42 However, Goddeeris acknowl-
edged that his model did not account for the possibility that the decision to enter
36. See Daniel Indiviglio, More Light Needed on Wall Street's Revolving Door, N.Y. THVIEs:
DEALBOOK (Nov. 20, 2014, 2:32 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/more-light-needed-on-
revolving-door/ [https://nyti.ms/2sYU6SF] ("The passage between Washington and Wall Street needs to
be clearly lit, but blocking it would do more harm than good.").
37. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials Among
Lawyers, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 246, 246 (1983).
38. Id. at 254-55 (discussing forms ofnonpecuniary compensation).
39. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 4 ("Attorneys may vary in their motivation for working at the
SEC. Some will be attracted to a career in public service, enjoying the opportunity to wear the 'white
hat."').
40. John H. Goddeeris, Compensating Differentials and Self-Selection: An Application to Lawyers,
96 J. POL. ECON. 411, 412 (1988) (extending the work of Weisbrod and finding that "[t]he results
suggest that preferences for public-interest work are related to personal characteristics").
41. See id. at 411 ("The model leads to simultaneous estimation of earnings and job choice functions
in a manner that takes account of self-selection of individuals into the sector of highest utility.").
42. Id. at 412.
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the public sector may be viewed as an investment-by "sacrificing current for
future income." 43
Robert Sauer further elaborated on Weisbrod and Goddeeris's models with a
dynamic model that accounts for the private- versus public-sector choice at vari-
ous points over time, thus allowing for the "investment" element missing from
Goddeeris's work.4 4 Using data on University of Michigan Law School gradu-
ates, Sauer considered "the future-oriented job choice decisions of attorneys
among five employment sectors." 45 He found that lawyers choose among the dif-
ferent sectors by considering "pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns, promotion
and dismissal probabilities, and the extent of transferability of human capital." 46
Once one acknowledges that employment in one sector (public) can be an
investment accruing benefits toward employment prospects in another sector (pri-
vate), it raises a new set of concerns: How can employees maximize returns on
their "investment," and, conversely, how can private-sector employers abuse this
dynamic to advance their own interests? Some scholars have suggested that
employees use their government experience "as a steppingstone to private prac-
tice" so that during their public service they focus on gaining valuable skills.47
Others add the cynical insight that staffers gain not only transferable skills but
also a platform from which to ingratiate themselves to future employers by being
more lenient toward them during their time at the agency.4 8
A vast body of literature regarding "regulatory capture" has developed around
the latter proposition. 49 Arguments that the revolving door is detrimental mostly
focus around the idea that the SEC has been "captured.""o Though an exact
43. Id. at 424 ("It assumes that sector choice is based only on current income and nonpecuniary
factors, thus ruling out, for example, the possibility that job decisions by lawyers may include an
investment component: sacrificing current for future income.").
44. Robert M. Sauer, Job Mobility and the Market for Lawyers, 106 J. POL. EcON. 147, 148-49
(1998).
45. Id. at 167.
46. Id. at 168.
47. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 86 (1969) ("The
principal attraction of [FTC] service to lawyers who wish to use it as a steppingstone to private practice
lies in the opportunities it affords to gain trial experience of an amount and at a level of responsibility
usually denied young men in private firms.").
48. See Zheng, supra note 1, at 1273 ("For regulators who are contemplating moving from
government to industry, they are said to have incentives to signal their appeal to prospective industry
employers by being lenient to them.").
49. For a detailed survey of the various models of regulatory capture, see Dal B6, supra note 3, at
204-19. For a similar survey of regulatory capture theory within the context of the SEC and a discussion
of the most prominent theories of regulatory capture (George Stigler school of thought), see Zheng,
supra note 1, at 1270-75 ("This exchange relationship between the demander and supplier of regulation
forms the central critique of the regulatory process by George Stigler and other members of the public
choice school, which has become the most notable strand of the capture theories.").
50. See Zheng, supra note 1, at 1267 ("Among the concerns voiced about the revolving door, the
most enduring one is the risk of regulators being captured by industry interests. Discussions of
regulatory capture and its impact on the regulatory process permeate scholarly literatures in law,
political science, and economics.").
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definition of "capture" may be difficult to articulate, one definition offered is
"whenever a particular sector of the industry, subject to the regulatory regime,
has acquired persistent influence disproportionate to the balance of interests
envisaged when the regulatory system was established."" There exists an exten-
sive body of literature discussing regulatory capture across a myriad of different
government agencies. 5 2 As one commentator describes it, regulatory capture is
reflected in "the unseemly appearance, if not reality, of an incestuous relationship
between regulators and industry that must surely risk fostering an improper influ-
ence of industry over the regulators."53
Critics do not expect movement through the revolving door to slow anytime
soon due to the growing demand for talent and specialized expertise.54
Regardless of whether any such "improper influence" exists, even the appearance
of disproportionate influence is a concerning dynamic. Personal contact and
close relationships between former and current SEC employees "may create the
appearance of conflicts of interest . . . even without direct evidence that undue
influence has affected an enforcement action, [and this] appearance of a conflict
of interest could undermine confidence in the enforcement process and the
SEC."" In the wake of the financial crisis, various post-mortems of its causes
have pointed toward regulatory laxity. A growing number of academics have
studied the attendant forces to regulatory capture.56 The SEC has been among the
51. Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the
Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 176 (2011).
52. See e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4; Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz,
Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); Cass Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory
Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329 (2014).
53. Baxter, supra note 51, at 197.
54. Id. ("As both our need for expert regulators and the skill of regulators increase, the doors between
regulators and the industry will spin faster.").
55. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABLITY OFF., GAO-11-654, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
ExISTING POST-EMPLOYMENT CONTROLS COULD BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED 12 (2011) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
56. Although our analysis primarily focuses on the revolving door phenomenon at the SEC, other
commentators have discussed revolving door links to the financial crisis at other banking regulators and
financial agencies. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in
to Wall Street, 81 U. CiN. L. REV. 1283, 1328-30 (2013) (discussing how industry influence undermined
the supervision of financial institutions by federal banking agencies (such as the Federal Reserve Board,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision), ultimately leading these agencies to adopt the "deeply flawed polices that
enabled large financial institutions to originate trillions of dollars of high-risk mortgages and to spread
the risks of those mortgages ... [and] helped to inflate the nonprime lending boom, which in turn led to
the financial crisis"); see also Timothy A. Canova, Central Bank Independence as Agency Capture: A
Review of the Empirical Literature, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 11 (2011) (discussing how
lack of industry independence among central banks, including the Federal Reserve, contributed to the
global financial crisis); Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law:
From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 369,
284-88 (2009) (discussing how the revolving door contributed to the failure of financial regulation
during time leading up to the financial crisis, noting that "[t]he officials who have been responsible for
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agencies targeted by such research.
Three prominent theories have emerged to predict how the revolving door
might impact SEC outcomes and regulatory action: the human-capital hypothesis,
the rent-seeking hypothesis, and the market-expansion hypothesis. These theories
frame regulatory and enforcement decisions in relation to the impact that those
decisions will have on an attorney's future employment prospects in the private
sector. All three theories rely on first identifying the ex ante incentives that a
revolving door generates for individual regulators. Once those incentives are
identified, predictions can be made about whether the result will be more or less
aggressive regulatory action.
According to the human-capital hypothesis, the presence of a revolving door
between a regulator and the regulated industry may actually be desirable.
During his or her time at the agency, a regulator (the individual actor within a reg-
ulatory agency) is incentivized by the prospect of gaining valuable qualifications
that are needed for their next job.59 Implicit in this model is the assumption that
regulators will be hired in the future based on their knowledge of the regulatory
environment and technical expertise.60 Regulators therefore have an incentive to
invest their human capital, also commonly referred to as "career capital,"61 during
their time at the agency.62 This capital includes not only the relevant skills
acquired through the job, but also the reputation of the attorney in the private
sector.63
designing our financial regulatory system are so often only a revolving door away from reaping the
rewards of unregulated speculation"); Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial
Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 348-50 (2013) (discussing prominent examples of "revolvers" at
top government agencies and how many critics believe that the financial industry's lobbying efforts
undermined regulation and monitoring of markets prior to the financial crisis); Dieter Zinnbauer, The
Vexing Issue of the Revolving Door 15 (Harvard University, Edmond J. Safra Working Paper No. 61,
2015), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2600633 [https://perma.cc/CPL6-GMBQ]
(discussing a number of studies measuring the impact of the revolving door on the financial sector and
concluding that these studies "at a minimum further corroborate the premise that revolving door
practices have played a significant role in building the close ties between government and business that
may have stymied effective oversight and stoked the financial crisis").
57. See infra Part IV.
58. See Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26
RAND J. EcON. 378, 378 (1995) ("[T]hese seemingly undesirable features of the regulatory system may
serve the interests of the government.").
59. See id. at 380.
60. See Ed deHaan et al., The Revolving Door and the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes: Initial
Evidence from Civil Litigation, 60 J. AcCT. & ECON. 65, 66 (2015) ("Crucial to whether revolving doors
enhance or compromise regulatory effort is the reason why the regulator is being hired by industry.").
61. Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of
Drug Crimes, 2 Am. L. & EcoN. REV. 259, 263 (2000) (measuring the returns to "career capital" for
prosecutors enforcing drug crimes).
62. See deHaan et al., supra note 60, at 66 ("If the SEC official is being hired primarily for his
knowledge of the complex regulatory environment and technical expertise, he will have an incentive to
invest in and/or demonstrate his human capital skills while at the regulatory agency to increase his future
prospects in industry, which, in turn, will make him enforce regulations more aggressively.").
63. See Glaeser et al., supra note 61, at 263 ("Career capital is meant to include building a reputation
(which has value in both the public and private sectors), exposure to private attorneys, and increasing
skill.").
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In addition to merely obtaining this human capital, regulators must also dem-
onstrate these qualifications to the industry in which they desire to be employed
in the future.64 This "signaling" is accomplished by aggressive enforcement of
agency policies.65 It is thus unsurprising that lead prosecutors in high-profile
cases consistently leave the public sector to join some of the largest and most
prestigious law firms in the country. 6 Such signals of competence, even though
directed to future employers, benefit the SEC; the aspiring staff member will
understand that a greater investment in her human capital, as well as a successful
pursuit of the agency's objectives, will attract attention in the private sector.6 7 So
viewed, the human-capital hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the strong lev-
els of performance and vigorous enforcement efforts of revolving door attorneys
furthers the SEC's overall objectives.
The rent-seeking hypothesis, on the other hand, works under the assumption
that a government agency official might instead be hired by future private-sector
employers because of their ability "to lobby and influence decision makers at
the agency."68 This hypothesis encompasses the classic theory of regulatory
capture-it posits that regulation will be compromised in an effort to appeal to
industry.6 9 Regulators therefore have incentives to invest and develop their net-
working skills, as opposed to investing in her own human capital or tirelessly
working to advance the agency's interests. 70 According to this theory, an SEC
employee might sacrifice agency efficacy in an attempt to curry favor and net-
work with prospective employers from the private sector.7 1
64. See Zheng, supra note 1, at 1268 ("According to this 'human-capital' theory, when industry
employers could not perfectly observe regulators' human-capital, revolving-door regulators would want
to be more aggressive, not less aggressive, in their enforcement actions as a way of signaling their
qualifications to industry employers.").
65. See Che, supra note 58, at 380 ("When the regulator's industry qualifications are not observable
to the industry, aggressive monitoring may become an effective way to signal her qualifications for
the industry job."); Zaring, supra note 11, at 520 ("The right way to signal worth to private prospective
employers may be, among enforcement officials, at least, aggressive pursuit of wrongdoing while in the
public sector.").
66. See Zaring, supra note 11, at 520 (discussing how the three lead prosecutors in the Enron case
went on to practice at Wachtell Lipton and Latham & Watkins).
67. See deHaan et al., supra note 60, at 67 ("Open revolving doors, whether they encourage some
lawyers to work harder or attract talented lawyers that seek to gain experience and move to future
employers, are associated with aggressive enforcement outcomes.").
68. Id. at 66; see Zheng, supra note 1, at 1267 ("[I]n order to secure a post-government position in
the private sector, the theory goes, regulators must bend the rules to curry favor with their prospective
employers.").
69. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 23 (2010) ("[C]apture operates because of the revolving-door phenomenon: the heads
of agencies often anticipate entering or returning to employment with the regulated industry once their
government service terminates. As a result, they do not want to make enemies within the industry by
regulating with what the industry will view as a heavy hand."); Zheng, supra note 1, at 1267 ("The
revolving door has long been considered an important mechanism of regulatory capture . . . .").
70. See Che, supra note 58, at 384 ("For example, if a regulator could be hired by a firm for her
abilities to influence her colleagues in the regulatory agency, she will try to accumulate her influence
contacts, which will divert her time or resources away from monitoring.").
71. See id.
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Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the
watchdog of auditors for public companies that is overseen by the SEC, experi-
enced harmful rent-seeking by its staff. Some PCAOB professionals were
indicted for tipping the Big Four accounting firm KPMG of the likely inspection
targets of its audits for various clients. 72 The government alleged that the PCAOB
staffers conveyed this sensitive information to KPMG while negotiating their
future employment relationships there with high-ranking KGMG personnel.73
Incentive-fueled behavior such as this results in a different prediction for SEC
regulatory and enforcement efforts, one that is consistent with assertions that the
SEC has been captured by the industry.74 The rent-seeking hypothesis predicts
that SEC regulatory and enforcement efforts will be compromised, resulting in
less aggressive action on the part of individual regulators and the agency as a
whole.
Yet another theory, the market-expansion hypothesis, contends that an entirely
different set of incentives steers SEC regulatory and enforcement behavior: regu-
lators seek to expand demand for the services and expertise that they will be able
to provide once they leave the agency.76 In the enforcement setting, this theory
predicts that regulators will increase demand for themselves in the future by pur-
suing aggressive agency enforcement, seeking higher penalties for violations,
and attempting to expand the scope of their agency's enforcement authority.
This theory has implications for the rulemaking setting as well. Under this model,
regulators may seek to expand the rulemaking authority of the agency, actively
pursue the use of flexible standards rather than bright-line rules, and may prefer
72. See Brian Sweet, Exchange Act Release No. 82,557, 2018 WL 495694 (Jan. 22, 2018)
(disciplining CPAs for their roles in providing confidential information regarding PCAOB inspections to
KPMG which was deeply concerned that in the most recent inspections of its audits of public companies
KPMG audit deficiencies had spiked to forty-six percent of the reviewed audits).
73. Id. 11 18-20, 31-38.
74. See Dal B6, supra note 3, at 214 (suggesting that regulators who are contemplating moving from
government to industry are said to have incentives to "signal their appeal to prospective industry
[employers] by being lenient to [them]").
75. deHaan et al., supra note 60, at 66 ("In contrast, if the SEC official is being hired primarily for his
ability to lobby and influence decision makers at the agency, he is likely to under-emphasize or even
compromise enforcement outcomes to curry favor with prospective employers.").
76. See Zheng, supra note 1, at 1280 (describing author's market-expansion theory for SEC
enforcement); see also Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL.
L. REv. 733, 752 (2016) (citing Zheng's work and discussing how the goals of agencies may diverge
from those of the Legislative or Executive branch); Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 68-
69 (2017) ("By pursuing more enforcement actions, seeking broader jurisdiction, and recovering higher
penalties, regulators may make more private employers interested in their personal expertise when they
ultimately go through the revolving door.").
77. Zheng, supra note 1, at 1269, 1280-81 ("In the enforcement setting, the market-expansion
incentive may result in more enforcement actions, broadened jurisdictional reach of the enforcement
actions, and higher penalties in the enforcement actions."); see also Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice
Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REv. 745, 774 (2013) ("[I]n order to flourish at
these post-SEC jobs, it helps to have grown the Agency's breadth and depth while employed there,
thereby facilitating bureaucratic imperialism, and in the process ensuring the continued relevance of the
Agency and the value of one's own expertise as a former bureaucrat.").
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the establishment of complex rather than simple policies and standards.7 8 The
normative implication of the market-expansion hypothesis from the SEC's per-
spective is less clear than those of the previous two theories. Increased enforce-
ment where market abuses exist certainly seems desirable, but self-serving
decisions regarding the structure and quality of the typical enforcement action or
agency rulemaking are likely to be detrimental to overall agency performance.
These categories of incentives are not mutually exclusive and may work in
conjunction with each other.7 9 Professor Langevoort describes the impact of ca-
reer effects on enforcement as follows:
[T]he career value for an SEC enforcement official is not from pandering to
potential target-employers, but from having a reputation for being quite
aggressive. That aggressiveness generates increased fear within the targeted
community and hence greater opportunities for the defense bar (who are also
well represented in the ABA and comparable groups). The most savvy SEC
enforcers may well push quite hard, but still leave something on the table for
opposing counsel to take credit for with his or her clients, remembering that
the tables will soon enough be turned. 0
According to this view, the SEC regulators act in accordance with all three of
the previously discussed hypotheses-this demonstrates their competence to
future employers, increases the market for their post-SEC services, and still cur-
ries favor with opposing counsel. Just as the revolving door likely does not have a
categorically detrimental or beneficial impact, the incentives it creates for SEC
enforcers are similarly nuanced and overlapping. 1
These theories demonstrate how the revolving door may create various per-
formance incentives for regulators. These different categories of ex ante incen-
tives result in different predictions for SEC enforcement behavior. Consequently,
these theories also help guide an analysis of the costs and benefits of the revolving
door.
78. Zheng, supra note 1, at 1269 ("In the rulemaking setting, [the market-expansion incentive] may
result in agencies' expanded rulemaking authority, the use of flexible standards rather than bright-line
rules, and agencies' preference for complex as opposed to simple rules or standards. In either case,
revolving-door regulators' focus may not be on finding the best way to appeal to industry interests as the
capture and human-capital theories suggest, but on finding the best way to maximize, through their own
efforts, the market demand for their post-government services.").
79. See Gubler, supra note 77, at 774-76 (discussing iterations of all three hypotheses and
concluding that "it is far from clear that the financial crisis provides evidence that undermines public
choice theory's validity").
80. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face
of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1621 (2006).
81. This produces varying levels of agency capture. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the
Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To
LIMIT IT 71, 74 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) ("There is a range of possibilities
ranging from a 'bad' agency that consciously favors industry over a clearly identifiable public interest to
a 'good' agency that seeks only to identify and serve the general welfare.").
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III. COST AND BENEFITS OF THE REVOLVING DOOR
Regardless of one's normative views about the existence of the revolving door,
most agree the revolving door is a fact of life at the SEC.82 During her confirma-
tion hearing, former SEC Chair Mary Schapiro acknowledged deep concerns
about the ramifications of the revolving door, as well as the potential negative
impact that restrictions on that movement might have on recruitment.83 She
expressed her desire to attract and retain talented employees who are knowledge-
able about the industry, but also stressed the need to avoid "conflict by their walk-
ing out the door and going to a firm and leaving everybody to wonder whether
they showed some favor to that firm during their time at the SEC."8 4 In her testi-
mony, Schapiro highlighted the inherent tension between the ability to recruit tal-
ented attorneys and the risk of industry influence and regulatory capture.
Despite the outrage displayed in much of the popular press, not all commenta-
tors view the revolving door as having a categorically negative impact on SEC
enforcement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, former Chair Mary Jo White herself falls
within this camp. White rejected characterizing the movement of attorneys
between private practice and public service as a "revolving door problem."" She
expressed that she did not believe her employment contributed to this problem;
rather, she viewed her experience in both private and public practice as integral
to her career development.86 She described the choices she made merely as "what
you did if you could to become a better lawyer."8 7 Although she acknowledged
that the concerns about avoiding regulatory capture are valid, she also warned
against any policy that would completely foreclose the movement from or to the
private sector." White maintained that her private-sector experience and intricate
knowledge of the industry improved her ability to make informed policy
82. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 9 ("The revolving door is such a dominant fact about the S.E.C.'s
culture." (quoting Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.)).
83. Nominations ofMary Schapiro, Christina D. Romer, Austan D. Goolsbee, Cecilia E. Rouse, and
Daniel K. Tarullo: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 28
(2009) [hereinafter Nominations] (statement of Mary Schapiro) ("I worry about the revolving door very
much. I hope that we can keep the best people at the SEC for the longest possible time. I worry, on the
other hand, about restrictions that will make it impossible for people to come to the Commission in the
first place.").
84. Id.
85. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION IN A CHANGING WORLD 22 (2015), https://americanassembly.org/sites/default/files/
download/events/thefutureof the sec in_a_changing-world.pdf ("The 'revolving door problem' is
not, in my view, an accurate description of movement between private practice and public service.").
86. Id. at 22-23 ("And, I think both the private sector and the public sector are benefitted by that kind
of career path. . . . [M]y private sector experience provided me with knowledge about how much
leverage the SEC had in using its power in appropriate cases. I would not have known that had I not been
in the private sector.").
87. Id. at 22 ("For example, I did pretty well in law school, went to practice in a good law firm, went
to the US attorney's office, and then returned to private practice. Others did the same. I never thought of
that as a 'revolving door,' just what you did if you could to become a better lawyer.").
88. Id. at 22-23 ("A policy prohibiting government agencies from bringing in experts from the
private sector, from the markets, would redound to the significant detriment of the public.").
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decisions during her tenure at the SEC.8 9 She stressed that we need to evaluate
the restrictions placed on those coming to the SEC from the private sector, but
she also called for an examination about "whether the public is ill-served or bet-
ter-served by the 'revolving door."'9 0
Other commentators such as Professor Zaring believe that the costs of the
revolving door have been "remarkably overstated."91 To Zaring, multiple factors
lessen the extent to which enforcers can shirk their duties in an effort to curry
favor. 92 Shirking is considered "costly" in the sense that it may lead to less "pro-
fessional advancement" within the agency, or it may be unwelcomed or even
punished by a regulator's superior.93 Further, the door to a higher paying private-
sector job is not a viable option for every SEC attorney; rather, it is an opportunity
that is only available to a select few.94 Zaring also questions the underlying
assumption that private-sector employment is viewed as superior to government
work for an overwhelming number of attorneys.9 5 Some attorneys simply prefer
government work and its corresponding benefits. 96 Contrary to the rent-seeking
hypothesis, these attorneys will not compromise their enforcement decisions in
an attempt to maximize their employment prospects in the private sector. Later in
this paper, we offer other reasons why we believe the risk of staff capture via the
revolving door, particularly of the rent-seeking hypothesis variety discussed ear-
lier, is greatly overstated.
As part of a report discussed below, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) conducted a series of interviews with former and current SEC employees,
academics, advocacy groups, representatives from regulated financial institu-
tions, and attorneys at private law firms in an effort to document the costs and
benefits associated with the revolving door. 97 The interviewees noted that the
revolving door may positively impact performance in both the private- and pub-
lic-sector by promoting a greater understanding of regulatory requirements and
89. Id.
90. Id. at 23 ("We do have to be sensitive to appearance, and we have all kinds of restrictions on what
people coming from the private sector can do at the Commission, depending on their respective prior
positions. That is good. But I think we need to step back and focus on whether the public is ill-served or
better-served by the 'revolving door,' and be clear about precisely what we are taking about.").
91. Zaring, supra note 11, at 507 ("But the revolving door's explanatory power is remarkably
overstated, especially when the subject is law enforcement.").
92. See id. at 517-18 (discussing why "shirking is costly").
93. Id. at 518 ("We can assume that such supervisors are unlikely to prefer employees who kowtow
to defense attorneys, instead of hanging tough with them. More broadly, no political leader wants to be
known as the supervisor of an agency that cannot deliver the services it is meant to provide.").
94. See id. at 519 ("The vast majority of regulators, even legally trained regulators, do not have these
sorts of private sector alternatives."). Zaring cites statistics regarding the overall tenure of attorneys at
the EPA as evidence of this assertion. Id.
95. See id. at 519-20 ("In addition, the prospect of private sector employment is not always
obviously an attractive alternative to the prospect of staying within the government, as any state-
employed law professor, all of whom have given up the prospects of better paid work in practice, can
attest.").
96. See id. at 520 (citing reasons why attorneys may prefer public work such as advancement
prospects, more manageable hours, and comparable pay in certain areas).
97. GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 11.
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increased levels of compliance.98 That is, the revolving door is central to the sym-
biosis of regulation and compliance. The basis for this proposition is that SEC
experience lends greater credibility to attorneys who presumably share their well-
founded understanding of securities regulation and "encourag[e] firms to adopt a
culture of compliance."99 In other words, SEC experience may "promote[] law
abidingness in the private sector by salting it with former public officials." 0 0
Similarly, the revolving door may result in enhanced communication between the
SEC and regulated industries.0 1 Experience and knowledge infused in the private
sector through SEC alumni will lead to open communication and an environment
of compliance. 10 2
The movement from the agency to industry is seen by many as necessary for
the government to recruit attorneys with specialized market expertise.103
Restrictions placed on post-SEC employment hinder the recruitment of knowl-
edgeable, top-performing attorneys from the industry." After all, a great deal of
the career value in performing a stint in a government agency is the ability for the
alumni to bring their knowledge and contacts with them to the private sector.0 5
Nonetheless, restrictions exist for the purpose of dampening, but not barring
entirely, the migration from the regulator to the regulated. Among the detrimental
effects cited by academics and advocacy groups in support of such impediments
is the concern that SEC employees, incentivized by future employment prospects,
may compromise the regulatory and enforcement efforts of the SEC as a means
98. Id. at 11 ("SEC experience may bring about a better understanding of securities regulation and
compliance in the private sector, which could benefit SEC and securities firms or firms that represent
securities firms. Former SEC personnel who take positions in the regulated industry or their
representatives, including law firms, may have enhanced credibility as a result of their SEC experience,
and thus greatly aid in encouraging firms to adopt a culture of compliance.").
99. Id.; see also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 569, 569-
70 (2012) ("Furthermore, working with industry can substantially improve the impact of regulation;
voluntary compliance is cheaper and can be more effective than enforced compliance, and industry can
help regulators minimize negative unintended consequences.").
100. Zaring, supra note 11, at 546.
101. See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 11 ("When employees of regulated entities or law firms
representing regulated entities are familiar with SEC regulations and the context of securities
investigations and enforcement, SEC and the employees of regulated entitles or law firms may
communicate more efficiently and openly about the matter being discussed.").
102. See id.
103. See id. ("Attracting specialized market experts, as well as those with the expertise that SEC
traditionally has sought (including lawyers, accountants, and compliance personnel) helps the agency
fulfill its mission of investor protection.").
104. See Nominations, supra note 83, at 28 ("If I can't leave and go to the industry after 5 years or 10
years, if I am doomed to stay at the SEC for life, maybe I will never go in the first place, and I don't
think that would be a good result either."); see also deHaan et al., supra note 60, at 66 ("Revolving doors
are natural in that the SEC needs industry specific expertise to monitor and regulate effectively, and
regulated firms need experience and knowledge of complex regulations to minimize the cost of
compliance.").
105. See Baxter, supra note 51, at 197 ("[A]s such rules become more absolute, the career paths for
incoming or outgoing regulators would become less valuable because part of the value former regulators
bring to private industry is that their privileged access to, and networks within, the agencies they
leave.").
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to curry favor with future employees.106 That is, the fear is that SEC staffers will
act consistent with the earlier described rent-seeking hypothesis. David Freeman
Engstrom refers to this form of capture-the "classic" story-as "materialist cap-
ture."'107 The concern is that current SEC employees might encourage less aggres-
sive enforcement as a quid pro quo for future employment prospects. 08
IV. CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL Focus
With so much debate over whether the revolving door has a net positive or net
negative effect on the SEC, commentators have attempted to resolve this matter
empirically. The general thrust of empirical examinations of this question have
focused on whether the data support the earlier described human-capital or rent-
seeking hypotheses. Because there are inherent limitations on data regarding links
between actions by the SEC and its staff, there are limits to the insights that can
be derived from available data. Accordingly, contemporary empirical work has
narrowly focused on revolving door practices and outcomes where observable
linkages exist. This has caused researchers to focus on the SEC's Division of
Enforcement in the federal courts, even though much of what the SEC does is not
enforcement related and much of the SEC's enforcement efforts are before
administrative law judges, not federal judges. The research is further limited
because the identity of which precise staff member is involved in a particular reg-
ulatory matter is not known, thus making it impossible to match a particular regu-
latory outcome with a particular member of the staff (who may have
subsequently departed for the private sector). Similar identification problems
plague administrative enforcement actions as the release of information regarding
individual attorney participation is not at all mandated for administrative pro-
ceedings or settlement actions.109 And there is the significant qualification flow-
ing from the fact the decision not to prosecute a case in the first place is not
observable and hence beyond empirical assessment.o
The leading empirical study of the impact of the revolving door on SEC
enforcement is by Ed deHaan, Simi Kedia, Kevin Koh, and Shivaram Rajgopa,11
106. GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 12 ("For example ... a current SEC employee could seek
enforcement compromises through settlements rather than pursue prosecution actions."). A more benign
explanation of SEC laxity, but no less harmful to the public interest, is that the staff and directors of the
SEC are too comfortable with the status quo. See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-
Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 117, 117-18 (2004) (explaining what enabled the
New York attorney general to become such a force in the financial frauds in the early years of this century
is that the SEC staff had become accustomed to existing market practices of those they regulated).
107. David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 31-32 (2013)
("The materialist version of capture is the classic account. Concentrated and diffuse costs and benefits
create asymmetric stakes among interest groups.").
108. See Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 Bus. LAW. 679, 725 (2012).
109. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 4.
110. deHaan et al., supra note 60, at 67 ("It is potentially even more likely that rent seeking behavior
manifests not in the choices of how a case is prosecuted, but rather in the choice of whether or not to
pursue a case at all.").
111. Id.
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who examined a hand-collected dataset of SEC litigation comprised of account-
ing related violations (1990-2007) and information about the SEC attorneys
involved in the matter, including whether they left the SEC. 112 Even though they
observed no statistically significant differences in the monetary sanctions
imposed in cases with revolving staffers (those who depart the agency for private
practice) and non-revolving staffers, their other findings are largely consistent
with the human-capital hypothesis and inconsistent with the rent-seeking hypoth-
esis. For example, revolving staffers are much more likely associated with cases
that charge the firm's CEO and a recommendation to the Department of Justice of
a criminal prosecution than cases overseen by non-revolvers. These findings are
even more dramatic for revolving staffers who migrate to a private law firm that
specializes in SEC matters (as measured by the number of cases in which the law
firm defends opposite the SEC).1 13 These two findings are consistent with aggres-
sive enforcement: levying a charge against the CEO and recommending a crimi-
nal prosecution each reflect aggressive enforcement by the attorney since seeking
a respondent's personal liability or introducing a criminal prosecution can be
expected to provoke influential people in the industry and to elicit the respondent
to defend more forcefully.1 14 Overall, when the authors studied the particular sub-
set of lawyers who left to join private firms that specialized in SEC defense work,
they found that such departing attorneys were involved with stronger enforce-
ment outcomes in terms of higher monetary sanctions (that were statistically sig-
nificant vis-a-vis non-revolvers), a greater probability that criminal proceedings
were recommended, and a higher likelihood that the respondent firm's CEO
would be charged. Importantly, their data reflected no significant difference in
the enforcement outcomes for "inbound revolvers" 15 in comparison to other law-
yers; however, it did reflect "some evidence of rent seeking behavior [] for re-
volver lawyers located in Washington DC, [as well as revolvers whose
destinations are] defense firms [with] numerous former SEC lawyers on staff."116
112. See id. ("About 58% (or 196) of the 336 lawyers continue to work for the SEC by the end of our
data collection period. About 11%, or 37 lawyers, leave the SEC to join employers other than law firms,
and the remaining 31% of the lawyers quit to join private law firms (referred to as 'revolvers').").
113. See id. ("The SECSPECIALIST variable captures each law firm's level of SEC specialization
based on the count of the number of cases the firm defends against the SEC in our sample.").
114. Id. at 66 ("Charging the CEO is considered aggressive because: (i) naming individual officers
antagonizes influential people who might hinder the SEC lawyers' future employment prospects; and (ii)
individuals are likely to defend their case more vigorously relative to only when their company is
named." (citing Jean Eagelsham, At SEC, Strategy Changes Course, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 11, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203405504576601251693560910 [https://perma.cc/
2727-GQ96])).
115. Inbound revolvers are "lawyers who join the SEC after working for private law firms." Id. at 67.
116. Id. at 91.
As the SEC's headquarters is located in Washington DC, most public firms, government
agencies and private law firms that deal with the SEC are likely to have a presence in
Washington DC. This will lead to greater external opportunities for SEC lawyers that are
employed in the Washington DC office. Further, the potential to lobby and build social and
political networks through which influence can be exercised is likely to be greater if the SEC
lawyer is located in in Washington DC. If such access to SEC decision makers facilitates
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The authors concluded that the results of their study were consistent with the
human-capital hypothesis, as well as the notion that future employment prospects
will impact SEC regulatory action by incentivizing attorneys to be more aggres-
sive in their enforcement.117
A related concern is that staffers may migrate to particular law firms. Not sur-
prisingly, several studies have found that law firms with an established securities
law practice account for a significant portion of the representation of those regu-
lated by the SEC. 1 s To illustrate this concern, consider the probable connection
between the revolving door concerns and the common practice of respondents in
successful SEC enforcement actions seeking a waiver of certain "bad actor" dis-
qualifiers as a component to settling the enforcement action. In multiple locations
throughout the securities laws are provisions that bar one from participating in
certain commercial transactions if that person has been subject to an SEC
enforcement action. For example, an investment bank that is subject to certain
types of SEC enforcement orders is thereafter barred from participating in the pri-
vate placement of securities.11 9 To avoid this commercially costly bar, enforce-
ment respondents who are market intermediaries and fear being barred from
further commercial activities regularly seek as part of their defensive strategy a
waiver of bad actor disqualifications. Professor Velikonja found that the bulk of
the formal waivers that the SEC granted to enforcement respondents were to large
investment banks; 120 such firms are presumably themselves represented in such
requests by law firms with deep securities regulation experience.
Professor Gadinis expressed disquiet surrounding the likely connection among
the relative size of an entity involved in an SEC enforcement matter, its represen-
tation by a law firm with expertise in securities regulatory matters and the exis-
tence of revolvers in that firm. He analyzed outcomes of SEC enforcement
actions against investment banks and brokerage houses from 2007 to 2008.121 His
data ultimately reflected that "defendants associated with big firms fared better in
SEC enforcement actions as compared to defendants associated with smaller
rent seeking, then lawyers located in the DC office should be associated with less aggressive
enforcement outcomes.
... The results suggest some partial support for rent seeking behavior among WASHDC
lawyers.
Id. at 81.
117. Id. at 92 ("In our particular setting, future job prospects, on average, appear to make SEC
lawyers increase their enforcement efforts in trying civil cases.").
118. See, e.g., deHaan, et. al., supra note 60, at 78-83 (collecting and examining employment
experiences of SEC enforcement staff including their migration to firms that appear frequently before
the SEC).
119. See Exemption for Limited Offers and Sales Without Regard to Dollar Amount of Offering, 17
C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(iv), (v) (2018) (barring use of the private placement safe harbor which has the
correlative impact on the investment bank engaging in the lucrative and large Rule 144A syndications
where resort to the safe harbor provided by Rule 506 is a step toward utilizing Rule 144A).
120. See Urska Velikonja, Waiving Disqualification: When Do Securities Violators Receive a
Reprieve?, 103 CALIF. L.REV. 1081, 1115 (2015).
121. See Gadinis, supra note 108, at 679.
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firms in three important dimensions": they were less likely to face individual, as
opposed to corporate charges; they had a higher likelihood of being dealt with in
an administrative proceeding, rather than an enforcement proceeding in a federal
court; and they likely faced fewer or lower sanctions.122 Gadinis stressed that his
results "do not appear to be the product of small sanctions against a few high-
profile firms. Instead, they appear to result from systematic differences in enforce-
ment outcomes between big- and small-firm employees."123 Therefore, the results
show that the SEC does not enforce equally against all defendants.124 Larger firms
seem to enjoy more lax enforcement. In discussing how these results implicate
regulatory capture, Gadinis hypothesized that the revolving door may have influ-
enced regulatory enforcement through socialization or cultural capture. 1 25
However, Gadinis did not inquire into the extent to which there were revolvers
within the law firm that represented the large investment banks and broker-deal-
ers in his study. Nevertheless, the connection between the revolving door fears,
waivers, and law firms with expertise in securities law is the focus of two reports
by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), an independent non-profit or-
ganization. 126 The SEC requires that any SEC alumnus who, within two years of
employment at the SEC, wishes to represent a client in a matter before the
Commission must file a disclosure statement. 12 7 Evidence that SEC experience is
prized by the private sector is reflected in the fact that in a five-year period revolv-
ers filed a total of 789 post-employment disclosure statements; the majority of
these statements were filed by former employees who worked in the Division of
Enforcement. 128 Moreover, among the 219 filing SEC alumni, 131-nearly sixty
percent of all filing parties-were employed by the same law firm as another filer;
one former SEC staffer filed twenty statements and one filing occurred within
two days of leaving the agency.1 29
Pursuant to a mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) similarly examined SEC post-employment disclosure state-
ments.130 The GAO examined both the movement of SEC alumni into private
practice and the internal controls that the agency has placed in order to mitigate
the resulting conflicts.131 According to the data, only about thirty-seven percent
of departing employees moved to employment as "examiners, accountants, econ-
omists, and attorneys." 13 2 The report noted there was an overall decrease in
122. Id.
123. Id. at 724.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 725-26.
126. PROJECT ON Gov'T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES ETHICS CHALLENGES
WITH REVOLVING DOOR 2 (2011).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 13 (documenting that 403 out of the 789 statements emanated from the enforcement
division).
129. Id. at 7, 10-12.
130. See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 2.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 8.
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employee departure from 2006 to 2010 and surmised that this decline was likely
due to diminished private-sector employment opportunities in light of the finan-
cial crisis.133 Using the same notice of appearance requests that POGO relied
upon in its report, the GAO acknowledged that SEC alumni filing these notices
were concentrated in certain employers: "Sixteen entities accounted for approxi-
mately 35 percent of the individuals filing notices of appearance . . . . Of the 16
entities, 9 were law firms, 5 were consulting firms, 1 was a financial firm, and 1
was an independent regulatory entity."134
In a follow-on 2013 report, POGO examined the revolvers' linkage to a range
of exemptions and waivers, such as the "bad actor" disqualifiers discussed
above.135 The report asserts that because so many of these accommodations were
requested by SEC alumni on behalf of their clients, this connection supports the
idea that the revolving door negatively impacts enforcement. POGO noted that
"if an SEC official used to represent companies seeking waivers or envisions him-
self doing so in the future, it's hard to see how he could remain completely neutral
in evaluating such requests."136 The report also raised the importance of the tone
at the top when considering the revolving door question. POGO stressed that the
two recent SEC Chairs had deep industry ties,13 7 such that "the close linkage
between the regulators and the regulated can influence the culture, the values,
and the mindset of the agency-not to mention its regulatory and enforcement
policies-both from the bottom up and from the top down."138
In a 2017 working paper, Choi and Pritchard report that only forty-eight per-
cent of the attorneys working in the SEC Division of Enforcement in 2004 were
still employed by the SEC in June 2016.139 Choi and Pritchard found that those
attorneys who were "NLJ 250" 140 partners in private practice prior to joining the
SEC and those who were top managers at the agency had a higher likelihood of
133. Id. at 9.
134. Id. at 10. The report undertook a thorough examination of the current controls in place at the
agency, discussing the "training and information for employees, staffing decisions, work process
controls, ethics advice, exit requirements for departing employees, and supplemental post-employment
rules for certain employees." Id. at 12. Even though the report looked favorably on the SEC's existing
efforts, it called for more information to be given to employees regarding ethics rules, conflict-of-interest
issues, and post-employment restrictions. Id. at 1, 12-15. The GAO recommended documentation of the
post-employment and conflict-of-interest advice that is given to current and departing employees to
increase transparency and assuage concerns regarding the movement of SEC alumni into the regulated
industry. Id. at 21.
135. PROJECT ON Gov'T OVERSIGHT, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC CREATES
RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE (2013).
136. Id. at 9.
137. Id. at 4, 6.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 14.
140. The National Law Journal conducts an annual survey of the nation's largest 250 law firms.
Firms that are listed among the largest 250 firms are referred to as "NLJ 250" law firms. See, e.g., The
NLJ 250: Our Annual Survey of the Nation's Largest Law Firms, NAT'L LAw J. (2012), https://www.
law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/12025467393 10/ [https://perma.cc/YB8C-HE57].
2019] 867
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
departure. 141 This is consistent with the idea that talented recruits travel through
the revolving door more quickly, and with the idea that lawyers who entered the
SEC from successful private practices can easily return to their former practice.
Perhaps most relevant to the debate, the authors found that attorneys who worked
on what they characterize as the more complex cases, such as Rule 1Ob-5 cases
where scienter is a much litigated issue, were more likely to leave the SEC. 142
The post-employment experiences of such attorneys are consistent with their hav-
ing greater talent than attorneys involved in other types of enforcement cases;
Choi and Pritchard noted that high performance is positively correlated with both
a greater overall likelihood of departure, as well as an increased likelihood that
these attorneys will achieve partnership status at the firm. 143 This movement is
consistent with the idea that "attorneys who produce tangible results for the
agency appear to be more likely to have attractive outside employment
options."144
Choi and Pritchard concluded that their results also contradicted the rent-
seeking hypothesis as their data does not reveal that there was any compromised
SEC enforcement. 145 Instead, they concluded that "longer term SEC attorneys
tend to underperform other SEC attorneys, consistent with the hypothesis that
higher performers may leave the SEC before becoming a long termer." 146 This
implies that those revolving through the door are more aggressive in terms of
enforcement than those who choose to stay at the agency for some time. That is,
such evidence of a revolving door reflects not capture but instead a meritocracy.
The authors also posited that the threat of losing top employees to more lucrative
jobs in the private sector could prompt the SEC to offer greater incentives to
retain those attorneys who are particularly susceptible to leaving. 14 7 Unlike the
deHaan study, Choi and Pritchard do not examine outcomes achieved by revolv-
ers when at the SEC but instead report on their relative mobility.
The preceding review of empirical studies have made important steps toward
measuring the impact of the revolving door at the SEC. However, there is still
room for additional research. 148 Although much of the attention given to the
revolving door in the popular press is negative and characterized by claims of reg-
ulatory capture, the preliminary quantitative research has caused people to
141. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 15. The results also demonstrated that those attorneys at a
regional office were less likely than attorneys at the Washington, DC or New York City office to leave
the SEC. Id. Choi and Pritchard found that female attorneys were more likely to stay at the SEC, with the
exception of female attorneys with a long tenure at the agency. Id.
142. Id. at 8, 16.
143. Id. at 16.
144. Id. at 16, 18.
145. See id. at 18.
146. Id. The study defines long tern attorneys as those "who started in 1990 or earlier . . .
(corresponding to attorneys with 15 years or more experience as of the end of 2004)" and short-term
attorneys as those "who started in 2000 or later ... (corresponding to attorneys with five years or less
experience at the SEC as of the end of 2004)." Id. at 8-9.
147. Id. at 19.
148. See supra Part II.
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reevaluate whether the revolving door should be unconditionally condemned.14 9
Studies such as those done by deHaan and his coauthors and Choi and Pritchard
suggest that the revolving door may actually result in increased enforcement at
the SEC. 5 o A recent study by Heese, Khan, and Ramanna adds further support to
this idea. 51 They found that regulated firms which have more extensive "political
connections" are more likely to receive comment letters from the SEC. This find-
ing is inconsistent with the common narrative of regulatory capture that suggests
such well-connected firms might enjoy lax enforcement as comment letters are
indicative of a proactive regulator, not one given to laxity in the particular
case. 15 2 Though the question is far from being resolved, the assumption that regu-
latory capture compromises agency enforcement has been called into question.
What we develop in the remaining portions of this Article are that the rent-seeking
hypothesis by the SEC staff -the dominant focus of the discussion thus far-has
deflected attention from the subtle forces that can bias the SEC's leadership team.
V. THE OVERLOOKED THREAT: DIVISION HEADS
With the exception of Choi and Pritchard,153 recent studies have not closely
examined what we believe is the more realistic fear of revolving door practices:
the recent practice of SEC division heads being mostly filled by partners from
large corporate-oriented law firms instead of by internal promotions. Internal pro-
motion to division head was the norm for the first sixty years of the SEC's exis-
tence.154 We believe a focus on division directors, where they come from and
where they return, is a far more significant issue than where their subordinates
migrate. The important focus in the revolving door debate should be on the
agency's division heads and not the staff This is, in part, because the collabora-
tive internal operations of the SEC cause us to believe that there is little opportu-
nity for SEC staffers to behave pursuant to the rent-seeking hypothesis.5 5
Equally significant is that division heads have many opportunities to engage in
agenda control. After briefly reviewing the organizational structure of the SEC,
we explore the recent shift in the backgrounds of division heads and the key
issues of collaborative action and agenda control.
To set the stage for our analysis, it is first necessary to look at the overall goals
of the SEC and its structure. Broadly stated, the SEC's missions are investor pro-
tection and the maintenance of vibrant securities markets that it pursues through
149. See supra Parts II-III.
150. See supra Part III.
151. See generally Jonas Heese, Mozaffar Khan, & Karthik Ramanna, Is the SEC Captured?
Evidence from Comment-Letter Reviews (Harv. Bus. Sch. Acct. & Mgmt. Unit Working Paper No. 17-
087, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2947752 [https://perma.cc/VM52-
PQNY] (finding in review of SEC comment letters that depth of review and seniority of the reviewing
staff are strongly correlated with political connections of reviewed party).
152. Id. at 26.
153. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 5, at 7.
154. See infra Section V.A.
155. See infra Section VI.B.
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its broad rulemaking authority, initiating either administratively or in the federal
courts enforcement actions, or invoking many mediums to provide administrative
guidance regarding the content of the securities laws.156 At the top of the agency
are five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S.
Senate, but the bulk of its work occurs through its five divisions: Corporation
Finance, Enforcement, Investment Management, Economic and Risk Analysis,
and Trading and Markets. 15 7 In addition to these five principal divisions, there are
twenty-five offices, including the Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, the Office of the General Counsel, and the Office of the Chief
Accountant. The SEC's overall operations include substantial staff in eleven re-
gional offices. 5 8 One of the appointed commissioners is designated by the
President to be the Chair of the Commission who has the added responsibility to
oversee the agency's administration; the Chair appoints division heads and direc-
tors of the offices. As a practical matter, with so many appendages housing the
Agency's 4,794 full-time staff, most decisionmaking is highly decentralized so
that a good deal of management, including supervision of staff and the setting of
priorities, occurs within its five principal divisions.15 9
A. DOCUMENTING THE SEC'S HIRING PRACTICES AND THE RECENT SHIFT TO HIRING
REVOLVER DIRECTORS
How have the SEC's hiring practices for division heads and general counsels
changed over time and why? In this section, we show that the Commission has
transitioned from internally promoting lifetime employees to top management
positions to a system that mostly employs outsiders for these top positions. In
Appendix I, we present data showing a dramatic and recent shift in the SEC's
managerial hierarchy toward being outsider-oriented rather than focused on inter-
nal promotions.16 0
To construct Appendix I, we consulted a variety of sources beginning with the
SEC Historical Society's website,16 1 which we used to find the names and years
of service for directors of the SEC General Counsel's office, Division of
Corporation Finance, Division of Trading and Markets, Division of Investment
Management, Division of Enforcement, and Division of Economic and Risk
156. See JAMES D. COX ET. AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-16 (8th ed.
2017).
157. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-621, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
IMPROVING PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IS CRITICAL FOR AGENCY's EFFECTIVENESS 6, Fig. 1 (2013)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]
158. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 8 (2017)
[hereinafter AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT]; GAO REPORT, supra note 157, at 6, fig.1.
159. See AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 8. Of that number, 4,672 are listed as
permanent positions. Id.
160. See Appendix I.
161. SEC. & EXCH. & COMM'N HIST. SOc'Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/ [https://perma.cc/S6Q5-
YP7C] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
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Management. Because it is derived from the data on the historical society web-
site, we are highly confident that this information is correct. 16 2
The more difficult project was compiling information about each of these indi-
viduals' pre-directorship positions either inside or outside the SEC. A preliminary
consideration was how to define the relevant time period for purposes of classify-
ing the directors as either "revolvers" or "non-revolvers" for our analysis. The
issue here is how long a director needs to be separated from private practice
before we consider him or her to be a non-revolver. After some debate, we settled
on eighteen months as a sufficient "cooling off' period for this purpose. 163 in
other words, if an individual director had been away from the private sector for at
least eighteen months, we classified that director as a non-revolver. Conversely,
directors that came to the SEC less than eighteen months after leaving private law
firms were classified as revolvers. 164 Revolvers are indicated with italics in
Appendix I to make it clear how we are coding them.
To ascertain the pre-SEC employment history of the division directors, we
used the SEC Historical Society website and a variety of secondary sources, as
well as a series of Internet searches. Because of the relatively new development
of the Internet, information was more widely available for the recent division
directors than for the older appointments. There were a few instances in which
we were unable to uncover enough information to categorize a director, and we
coded these directors as "Insufficient Information Available."
Table 1 uses the information contained in Appendix I to calculate the fre-
quency of revolver director appointments over time for the major divisions and
General Counsel's office of the SEC. However, to put this table together, we also
made some simplifying assumptions. First, to calculate the number of revolvers
and the number of total directors for each of the twenty-year time periods, we
counted each individual as a director only in the first time period in which they
were a director. Thus, a director who held that position from 1953 to 1956 would
count as a director only in the time period from 1934 to 1954 and not as a director
for the time period from 1955 to 1975.165 We made the same assumption for their
status as revolvers or non-revolvers.
162. We omit from our calculations in Table 1 consideration of revolvers for the Division of
Economic and Risk Management because that division has been in existence for only a decade. As such,
making historical reference to the division is unlikely to add value to our analysis here.
163. We decided that eighteen months was an appropriate balance between the time needed for an
individual to divorce his or herself from the prior experiences in private practice and the difficulties
associated with documenting some directors' previous job experiences. We do not believe that our
results would be changed materially by using a longer or shorter period of time.
164. Similar reasoning supports our treatment of the person who moves from the private sector to
become an SEC division head and thereafter, even more than eighteen months after first entering the
SEC, assumes the directorship of another division. We view such a serial division head as being a
revolver in each of the two divisions.
165. We make this assumption because we lack precise data on the dates which these directors are
coming and going from the SEC. As a result, the statistics in Table 1 should be viewed solely as
descriptive data that provide a sense of the magnitude of the shift over time in the background of the
directors.
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Second, we counted a director whose job tenure includes any month in a year
to have held that position for a full year.166 For example, a director who assumed
their position in February 2010 and ended their directorship in November 2011
would be counted as having served two years as a director. We apply the same
assumption to their status as a revolver or non-revolver.
Table 1 summarizes the data on how frequently revolver directors are
appointed in each major division and the General Counsel's Office between 1934
and 2017.
What is apparent in the data is a sharp shift toward hiring more revolver direc-
tors in the late 1990s. We turn next to trying to explain why this change occurred.
B. THE SHIFTING SOURCE OF DIRECTORS AND ITS IMPACTS
1. Explaining the Shift from Internal Promotions to Revolver Hires: Outside
Expertise
Prior to the 1980s, the SEC had always promoted from within when it needed
to fill an open position for a director at the Division of Corporation Finance. By
relying on its own internal candidates, the agency was able to create strong incen-
tives for capable staff members to engage in lifelong careers at the Commission.
At that time, staff positions at the Division were considered good jobs: the com-
pensation was fair (and the disparity between government and private practice
compensation was not as great as it later became), there was prestige in working
for the agency, and staffers enjoyed plenty of responsibility and oversight.
However, as a former Corporation Finance director, Director One, remembered
in a lengthy interview with the authors, entry-level employees were permanent
staffers, almost none of whom had private experience and all of whom were ca-
reer employees. 16 7 The seeds for change in selecting Corporation Finance heads
were contained in the pathbreaking SEC Special Study.
The SEC released its Special Study in 1963.168 The project was funded by a
special appropriation of $6 million (adjusted for inflation),16 9 and was carried out
by a team of lawyers, economists, financial analysts, and statisticians led by
Milton Cohen, a career SEC staffer who had the requisite understanding of the
SEC.1 70 The resulting report entailed three distinctive contributions that occurred
in three phases over the life of the project. The first phase involved mapping and
evaluating changes in capital markets. The second phase reviewed the then-existing
regulatory structure of capital markets. The third phase raised questions about
overall institutional design. The Special Study was a mix of qualitative and
quantitative analyses, surveys, case studies, and statistics that presented a
166. As with the previous note, we make this assumption because of data limitations.
167. Independently, Director Two noted that this earlier system was similar to the UK model for
agencies, which are staffed by individuals who spend their entire career with the agency.
168. See ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF
EXPERTISE 60-62 (1992).
169. ED BALLEISEN ET AL., A SECOND STUDY OF CAPITAL MARKETS: WHETHER, WHAT AND How? 2
(2013).
170. See KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 64.
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broad overview of financial markets and their participants, trading strategies,
the roles and performance of government regulators, and a set of policy
recommendations. 17 1
Among the findings of the Special Study was that the enormous growth in
securities markets had led to destabilization; that there had been a rapid increase
in the number of brokers such that many were inexperienced; that industry was
increasingly impacted by anticompetitive practices; that there were inefficiencies
in "back-room" practices; and that there existed troubling practices by floor trad-
ers and specialists. 172 The Special Study is credited with placing the Commission
on a firm intellectual footing equal to Wall Street so that it was better able to carry
out the mandates of the laws entrusted to it. 1 7 3 The Special Study is also recog-
nized as having set the policy trajectory for both Congress and the SEC, espe-
cially in areas of disclosure for then-unlisted securities as well as a range of
broker-dealer practices. 17 4 Although the Special Study is credited with placing
the SEC on a level equal to market professionals in terms of mapping the multiple
forces then shaping American capital markets, the Special Study also docu-
mented how rapidly changes were taking place in how markets operated and the
practices of market participants and their advisors. 1 7 5
Despite the Special Study underscoring the importance of regulators having a
deep understanding of developing securities practices, it was not until President
Carter's appointment of SEC Chair Harold Williams that the Special Study
impacted personnel choices for leadership of the SEC's key divisions. 176
Williams wished to implement the Special Study and believed the SEC needed
"on-the-street" experience if disclosure mechanisms and requirements were to
both be efficient and serve the public interest. The Special Study's central mes-
sage was that better regulation begins with a deep understanding of how capital
markets operate. Director One recounted increasing frustration with how long it
took for the SEC to take action; Chair Williams wanted to make the SEC more ef-
ficient. The perception at the time was that the agency needed people from private
practice with deep knowledge of industry practices in financial markets. Director
Three remembers that markets in the 1980s became increasingly complex so that
171. See id.
172. See id. at 60.
173. One of the authors was the convener and reporter of a roundtable convened in Washington D.C.
on June 4, 2013 to discuss whether a second SEC Special Study should be undertaken. The discussion
was synthesized into a "white paper" that included analysis of the structure and contributions of the
SEC's Special Study that is discussed in this paragraph. See BALLEISEN ET AL., supra note 169, at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5.
176. In the text between notes 177-87, within section V.C, and the text beginning with note 246
through the conclusion of Part VI, there are multiple references to insights regarding the SEC provided
by four individuals, each of whom either had served as a director of a division of the SEC or as its
general counsel. The authors interviewed these former directors and general counsels individually over
the phone: telephone interview with Director One (Jan. 12, 2018); telephone interview with Director
Two (Jan. 17, 2018); telephone interview with Director Three (Jan. 24, 2018); telephone interview with
Director Four (June 15, 2018).
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there was a need to bring in "high levels of knowledge" that existed on "the
street" that were not otherwise likely to be found internally.
Williams took action to hire someone with this background. Director Three
recalled that the practice of regularly bringing in outsiders to head SEC divisions
began when Williams hired Ed Greene. Greene was brought into the Corporation
Finance Division as an assistant to Dick Rowe for several months. Greene was a
partner at the law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP before moving to the SEC.
He replaced Rowe as director of that division six months after joining the SEC
and then served as its director from 1979 to 1981.177 He was the first director of
the Corporation Finance Division that had previously been a law firm partner.
Greene later became General Counsel for the SEC from 1981 to 1982.178
Subsequently, he reentered private practice as a partner at the law firm Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.1 79
Greene's hiring was followed in the late 1990s by many others as the SEC tried
to find experienced lawyers from the private sector that wished to serve the public
instead of their clients' private interests. The SEC needed these lawyers' deep
industry experience gained through years of private practice to advance the objec-
tives of securities laws. Director Two observed that this model has benefits in
terms of the real-world experience brought to bear on regulatory and enforcement
questions, although Director Two acknowledged that it did create more conflicts
of interest.
What was the effect of this shift on SEC policy? One possible effect is that
these more experienced directors were willing to undertake new policies. For
example, the early 1980s were a transformative era for the SEC as it undertook a
sweeping review of its disclosure guidelines and developed a basic information
package that was required for all transactions regulated by the SEC.so Whereas
in the SEC's first fifty years, mandated disclosure about a company varied widely
depending on whether the disclosure was in its annual report, registration of a
public offering, or in a proxy statement, once the SEC developed the core features
of the basic information package, the disclosure guidelines became identical for
each of these regulated events. This then set the stage for established companies
to access capital markets more quickly through the SEC's integrated disclosure
process, insofar as information that companies had already filed with the SEC
could be incorporated by reference.8 1 The upshot of this disclosure revolution
was allowing established companies to engage in "shelf registration" whereby
mandated disclosure could be satisfied days, weeks, or even months before the
securities were sold.18 2 Shelf registration had the effect of reducing companies'
177. EdwardF. Greene, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/edward-f-
greene [https://perma.cc/LD87-Y4GG] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See COX ET AL., supra note 156, at 178-80.
181. See id.
182. Shelf Registration, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889, 52,889 (Nov. 23, 1983) (promulgating Rule 415,
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2014)).
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exposure to market risk with the consequent reduction in commissions garne-
red by underwriters for such offerings.183 Each of these developments-which
represented radical shifts in the regulatory structure of the American securities
laws-required detailed experience in the functioning of capital markets. Such
experience was not present within the career staff of the SEC.
The data in Table 1 shows some support for our expertise hypothesis. For
example, if we examine director appointments to the Division of Corporation
Finance over time, Ed Greene was the sole revolver appointed to run that
Division between 1934 and 1999, when David Martin was appointed. 18 4 As we
discussed, Greene's appointment was the result of the SEC's need for additional
expertise in its drive to implement the Special Study. This event required unique
skills, consistent with our hypothesis that division director appointments can be
driven by a need for expertise. Since 1999, every director of the Corporation
Finance Division has been a revolver.1 8 5
Another explanation for hiring revolvers relates to the need for expertise in the
Office of the General Counsel. The General Counsel is, according to Director
Four, the SEC Chair's lawyer. Director Four believes that SEC Chairs want to
have their lawyer in that position. Table 1 shows that the General Counsel's
office, and only that office, has a long history of employing a high percentage of
revolvers.18 6 One possible explanation for this unique aspect of the Office of the
General Counsel is that it has a longstanding need for expert practitioners that are
up-to-date on the legal issues that it handles. The Office's continuing need for ex-
pertise could explain its relatively heavy dependence on outside lawyers, which
is consistent with the expertise hypothesis discussed earlier for the Division of
Corporation Finance.
A second potential explanation for the stark difference in the historical hiring
patterns for the Office of the General Counsel versus those of the five principal
SEC divisions relates to Director Four's observation that SEC Chairs want their
personal lawyer in that position. We hypothesize that an SEC Chair who is
appointed from a staff position is more likely to select SEC staff members to be
General Counsel, whereas an SEC Chair hired from private practice is more
likely to select attorneys from private practice. The intuition behind this hypothe-
sis is that SEC staffers are more likely to be comfortable and have first-hand ex-
perience working with other SEC staffers, whereas private practitioners have a
similar propensity for other private practitioners.
To test this hypothesis, we first compiled Appendix II, a historical summary of
the SEC Chairs and their experience eighteen months prior to their appoint-
ment. 18 7 Each of the Chairs whose names are followed by the symbol "+" were
SEC Commissioners prior to their appointment as SEC Chair. The data show that
183. Id. at 189-92.
184. See Appendix I.
185. Id.
186. See Table 1.
187. See Appendix II.
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this was quite common until the 1970s and has since ended completely. Chairs
whose names are in italics all came to the position from private practice."ss
Fifteen Chairs were either law firm partners or heads of investment firms prior to
joining the SEC.18 9 Finally, the four names in bold typeface, as best as we can tell
given the information available, became Chairs from SEC staff positions.
Appendix III takes this data and adds to it the names and affiliations of the SEC
General Counsel that served with each Chair.1 90 All revolvers have their names in
italics in Appendix III.
Did these Chairs follow the pattern that we predicted in making their General
Counsel appointments? In Table 2, we present data that connects each Chair to
the General Counsels that they appointed or served with.1 91
TABLE 2. SEC CHAIR AND GENERAL COUNSELS: CORRELATIONS OF REVOLVERS/
NON-REVOLVERS
Dates (1953-2018) Revolver Non-Revolver
Chair Chair
All General Counsel Revolvers 6 3
All General Counsel Non-Revolver 2 5
Multiple General Counsels: Mixed Revolver and 3 2
Non-Revolver
We recognize that there are two limitations on our conclusion. First, due to the
limited number of data points available, we are unable to test for statistical signif-
icance. Second, we have excluded data for years prior to 1953 because all
General Counsel were insiders prior to this year.
With those two caveats in mind, Table 2 shows that SEC Chairs who are them-
selves revolvers more frequently hire other revolvers as their General Counsel
than non-revolvers. Conversely, SEC Chairs that are non-revolvers are also more
likely to hire internal candidates to be their General Counsel than to hire revolv-
ers. We also see some instances where Chairs may have a revolver General
Counsel for some of their tenure and a non-revolver for another part of their ten-
ure. Overall, we view these data as consistent with our hypothesis that revolver
Chairs are more likely to hire revolvers as their lawyers, whereas non-revolver
Chairs are more likely to select internal candidates.
188. Id. An SEC Chair who was both an SEC Commissioner prior to their appointment as Chair and
who became Chair after private practice would therefore have their name in italics followed by the +
symbol.
189. Id. Four of these were SEC Commissioners prior to assuming the Chairmanship.
190. See Appendix III.
191. Because the Chair can remove a General Counsel at will, we consider General Counsels that
served during the tenure of a Chair to have been implicitly selected to serve in the position.
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2. Explaining the Shift from Internal Promotions to Revolver Directors: The
Politicization of the SEC
The need for outside expertise, however, is not the only force shaping leadership
selections at the SEC; politics matter, too. Here the story begins in the 1970s, when
the once-nascent SEC Division of Enforcement flexed its muscles. Under the
inspired leadership of two career employees who led its enforcement efforts, Irving
Pollock and Stanley Sporkin, there was a growth in the number of enforcement
actions; moreover and significantly, the enforcement actions during this period fre-
quently tested the outer limits of the SEC's ability to regulate conduct through
enforcement. 192 In particular, Stanley Sporkin's aggressive pursuit of bribery of pub-
lic officials not only prompted enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but
earned the SEC's enforcement efforts the ire of the business community.193
During the 1980s, the SEC arrived on the political stage in which the role of
government and government regulation enjoyed a central role in national political
discourse. Following the Reagan landslide, the SEC turned away from its prior
aggressive pursuit of cases and focused its enforcement efforts on traditional
areas. 194 Indeed, in 1981, the transition team for the newly elected President
called for a thirty-percent reduction in the SEC's budget and a three-quarters
reduction in its enforcement staff.195 This development stands in sharp contrast
with the long-standing view that the SEC was a technocratic monitor of unscrupu-
lous practices in U.S. securities markets whose functions were beyond politics. 1 96
The Reagan Administration's deregulatory agenda swept across many federal
agencies,19 7 but the SEC was a large focus.198 President Reagan nominated John
Shad, a Wall Street banker, to serve as Chair, 1 99 who in turn installed John
192. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at
the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 192-97 (1990) (reviewing several areas where the SEC during
the 1970s blazed new enforcement paths); see also KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 167 ("[M]ore than
any other representative of the agency, Sporkin had been closely identified with SEC activism
throughout the 1970s.").
193. Sporkin had become a "symbol of the commission's reputation for vigorous nonpartisan
independence," Jeff Gerth, S.E.C.'s Future Focus in Doubt, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 29, 1981), https://www.
nytimes.com/1981/01/29/business/sec-s-future-focus-in-doubt.html [https://nyti.ms/29KswBF], and his
removal took "a big headache out of Wall Street." Robert A. Rosenblatt, Stanley Sporkin, SEC's
Toughest Cop, Gets General Counsel Post at CIA, L.A. TIMEs (Apr. 22, 1981), at Fl. See also,
KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 167 (noting that the activities of the Enforcement Division under
Stanley Sporkin were criticized in the Reagan transition team's report which recommended replacing
him and reducing the resources of the Enforcement Division).
194. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 192, at 154-55. A recurrent theme was that the regulatory focus
should be on creating enduring economic incentives and not government enforcement as a means to
motivate compliance with the law. Id. at 198-99.
195. Final Report of SEC Transition Team, 587 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) K-1, K-I (Jan. 21, 1981);
Gerth, supra note 193.
196. KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 153.
197. See Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of
Reagan's First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 300 (1985).
198. Gerth, supra note 193.
199. KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 156-57.
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Fedders, a partner from a D.C. law firm, to head the Enforcement Division.200 In
such a politically sensitive environment, not only was the SEC's Chair to reflect
the sentiment of the President, but the Chair also needed assurance that his vision
would be implemented by the Commission's staff.
A second political dimension contributing to the practice of appointing individ-
uals from the private sector was the increased politicization of regulatory agen-
cies that began in the 1980s and accelerated in the mid-1990s. 201 Like so many
other regulatory agencies, presidential appointments of SEC commissioners are
subject to partisan balance requirements, which mandate that no more than a sim-
ple majority of agency members may come from a single party.202 Through the
1980s, Presidents regularly complied with this requirement by appointing ideo-
logically aligned members of the opposite party. For example, a Republican pres-
ident might appoint a Libertarian commissioner when the Commission already
had three Republican members and a Democratic president could appoint a lib-
eral Republican. This congenial arrangement came to an end in the mid-1990s
such that agencies generally-the SEC being no exception-became more di-
vided at the commissioner level. 203 Regulatory agencies, including the SEC, were
swept up in the increasing partisan divide that has been underway since the
1980s. 204 This development coincided with, and likely caused, Presidents to more
200. John Fedders was appointed despite strong agency precedent that would have led to the
selection of one of the Division's associate directors. KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 167 ("[T]his
pattern of secession had existed within the division for years.").
201. We also observe that the agenda for the SEC has become more politically sensitive as its
mandate has expanded beyond disclosures believed to protect investors and nurture capital formation.
This marks the date of the historic Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The
Politicization of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder
Ratification of Auditors, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 501, 502 (2012) (discussing how starting in 2002,
Congress transferred to the SEC direct substantive authority over many aspects of the corporate
governance process, so that the SEC increasingly is called upon to develop substantive standards and to
arbitrate the often irreconcilable positions of interest groups vying to influence the governance process).
However, our data shows that the practice of appointing division heads from the private sector was
pervasive by 2002, so that congressional mandates such as SOX are at best an important contributing
force.
202. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1943) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012)); see Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 797 tbl.4 (2013) (listing
agencies subject to party balancing requirement).
203. Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 45-
48 (2018) (analyzing 578 appointees to twenty-three agencies over six Presidents to conclude that
dramatic politicization occurred across the agencies in the mid-1990s mirroring the partisan "sort"
occurring across the electorate generally).
204.
Opposition-party senators agree with each other and disagree with the policy priorities of the
President and his party. Consequently, opposition-party senators make use of holds and other
delaying strategies to see to it that the President nominates opposition-party Commissioners
loyal to the opposition party, not to the President. At the same time, party polarization also
explains why today's independent agencies are more likely to agree with presidential prefer-
ences once the President appoints a majority of his party to the agency. In particular, party
polarization between Democrats and Republicans means that party identity is an especially
good proxy for commissioner ideology.... Before 1980, modest party polarization was the
2019] 879
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
closely link the work of independent regulatory agencies such as the SEC with
the policies sought to be carried out by the White House by appointing agency
heads who share the president's regulatory objective.205 For example, Reagan's
SEC Chair shared the President's deregulatory agenda in contrast to the Carter
appointee's emphasis on subject-matter expertise.206
Within an administrative environment bounded by deep ideological divi-
sions and links to the national policies set at the White House, staying on mes-
sage is essential for SEC Chairs. Achieving this objective requires maintaining
division heads on whom the Chair can rely to carry out the Chair's agenda.
Such a person could, of course, be found within the SEC. However, a career
staffer poses uncertainty regarding institutional loyalties: the staffer might
enjoy a working relationships with others in the agency, including, perhaps,
opposition-party commissioners with whom she has worked collaboratively.
Such concerns, and the ongoing ideological divisions, are ultimately consistent
with the dramatic shift toward appointing division heads from outside the
SEC.
Thus, we can see that resorting to the private sector to staff the directorships of
the SEC was not only in response to the Special Study, which found that the SEC
needed individuals with a deep understanding of contemporary markets to carry
out its mission and it was also in response to a political desire to have individuals
whose allegiance to the Chair was not adversely impacted by the protections
afforded career employees through the independence provided by civil service.
Looking at Table 1 and the overall averages over time, there is a slow creep in the
percentage of revolvers hired as division directors and general counsels from the
inception of the SEC until the period from 1976 to 1996. However, this is fol-
lowed by a marked increase in the frequency of revolvers from 1997 to 2017. If
we consider the two theories explaining the rise of revolvers that we have previ-
ously discussed-the SEC's need for increased expertise beginning in the 1980s
(as evidenced by the appointment of Ed Greene) and the increased politicization
of the SEC during and after the Reagan years-this data seems most consistent
with the politics story. In other words, once the Reagan team made its revolver
norm and, correspondingly, opposition-party senators did not use delaying strategies to
advance their agenda.... [W]e see the Reagan presidency as transformative-separating a
period of modest party polarization from a period of ever-increasing polarization.
See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459,461 (2008).
205. Id. at 477; see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 131 (2003) ("[T]he one constant in Clinton's
appointments ... was relatively strong confidence in the nominee's fidelity to the president's agenda.");
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001) ("[P]residential
control of administration ... expanded dramatically during the Clinton years, making the regulatory
activity of the executive branch agencies more and more an extension of the President's own policy and
political agenda.").
206. Devins & Lewis, supra note 204, at 481.
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appointments, the genie was out of the bottle on politically motivated appoint-
ments and the frequency of revolver appointments soared. Note, however, that
although this raises the likelihood of agenda-control motives for SEC directors,
the type of agenda-control issues we might anticipate becoming more likely
are those that arise from political differences (left against right battles) as opposed
to those that involve more mundane financial conflicts of interest, that is, the tra-
ditional revolving door issues.207
3. Explaining the Shift from Internal Promotions to Revolver Hires: Financial
Forces
Although not apparent from Table 1, prospective outside directors' financial
incentives have changed over time as well. Director Three recalls that by the
mid-1980s, the economics of private lawyers taking several years away from their
practice to work at much lower compensation in government service improved
significantly. On the one hand, Director Three notes, most transactional law part-
ners were enjoying rising incomes from private practice so that they could afford
to take a break and have financial resources to absorb substantial temporary cuts
in pay while they were at the Commission. Equally important, because of the
strong market for experienced attorneys, these same practitioners could be
assured that, upon leaving the SEC, there would be a strong demand for they serv-
ices so that their could reenter private practice after their time at the SEC.
For junior attorneys, a move to the SEC was a means of enhancing their under-
standing of the regulatory environment. 2 08 Director Three recalled that SEC work
was seen as a way to get additional training, and most attorneys thereafter moved
to law firms or related regulators such as then-NASD (now, FINRA) and NYSE. It
was also understood that broadening one's appeal post-SEC required not only
obtaining such knowledge and training, but also demonstrating a record of zeal.2 0 9
Director Four recalled that over time it became harder to keep good in-house
personnel at the SEC for their entire careers. The pay differentials between the
public and private sector widened for lawyers with regulatory experience.
Talented people had good alternative options. Washington D.C. and New York
207. It is, of course, possible that the greater presence of politically motivated division directors may
be associated with a higher incidence of financial conflicts of interest if these directors are especially
susceptible to outside lobbyists' influence. If this is true, then the rise of political division directors may
be a driver leading to increased financial conflicts of interest and traditional revolving door issues.
208. KHADEMIAN, supra note 168, at 89. Additionally, the work that is available to junior attorneys at
the SEC is far more interesting and challenging than what they would have received at a private law
firm. Id. at 90.
209. See id. at 89-91 (discussing how good lawyers come to the SEC because of the opportunity to
gain legal experience that is in high demand at private law firms, but what they gained was legal
expertise and that "there is no incentive to favor a particular economic interest in agency decision
making"). Khademian also notes that departing SEC employees go to work for law fims, not brokerage
fims, and therefore they cannot be captured by industry. See id.
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grew more expensive over time and difficult for public servants to afford living
in. The net result of these financial factors was to make it difficult for SEC law-
yers to maintain a reasonable standard of living and to encourage them to move
into the private sector.
C. THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED REVOLVER APPOINTMENTS ON STAFF MORALE AND
RETENTION OF LONG-TERM EMPLOYEES
In our interviews with former directors, it became evident that these changes
had an impact on the SEC's internal labor market and employee morale. Director
Two observed that today, a high percentage of the SEC's staff could be seen as
lifetime employees, coming to the SEC after a few years in private practice, hired
for their legal skills experience, and then staying at the SEC. Those who devel-
oped skills while at the SEC could later return to private practice, if they had
developed strong marketable skills. Director Two said that those with such skills
had good employment options.
Director Three felt that the revolving door had some impact on the SEC's per-
sonnel. Although the old practice of promoting from within retained staff for long
periods of time, such staff did not have sufficient outside knowledge. Increased
use of outsiders at top levels changed the career path for staffers: some became
permanent staffers, others became revolvers that returned to practice quickly.
Cutting off internal promotion opportunities by hiring outsiders is likely to have
negative effects on lifetime staff employees because they would see little likeli-
hood of moving up within the SEC once they reach the level just below Associate
Director.
Director Four also believed that the politicization of the SEC had a negative
effect on staff morale. Director Four pointed to the impact of the Reagan adminis-
tration as having a detrimental effect on the way that people viewed public serv-
ice. For example, with the SEC commissioners, although it was once true that
Presidents would appoint career staff as commissioners, recently these have
become almost exclusively political appointments. This cuts off an internal route
for promotion of senior staff Director Four was quite clear that the SEC should
be a nonpolitical agency.
VI. CULTURAL ROOTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REACH OF DIVISION HEAD'S INFLUENCE
The preceding section described the Darwinian effects on agency appoint-
ments caused by the growing and hardening political division within
American politics. The development in the 1980s of appointing division heads
from the private sector-and acceleration of the practice in the 1990s-
brought to the SEC's managerial center individuals steeped in years of repre-
senting the regulated. This Part explores why this change in practice might
pose special capture risks. Such risks, however, may well be ameliorated, in
much the same way as the rent-seeking hypothesis is deeply qualified, by the
strong collaborative culture within the SEC. Both considerations are examined
in this Part.
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A. THE CULTURAL CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS
A newer conceptualization of capture is referred to as "cognitive" or "cultural
capture." 2 10 This non-materialist category of capture occurs when industry shapes
the underlying beliefs and perspectives of regulators. 2 11 Attorneys who join the
SEC from employment in the regulated industry may be "socialized" toward the
industry.2 12 In other words, their prior experience may skew their perspective on
regulatory issues.213 They may become conditioned to think in ways that favor
the regulated industry.2 14 One scholar has identified three particular mechanisms
in the financial industry through which cultural capture shapes regulators'
beliefs:
(1) Identity: Regulators are more likely to adopt positions advanced by people
whom they perceive as being in their in-group.
(2) Status: Regulators are more likely to adopt positions advanced by people
whom they perceive to be of higher status in social, economic, intellectual,
or other terms.
(3) Relationships: Regulators are more likely to adopt positions advanced by
people who are in their social networks.2 15
The forces that shape cultural capture raise concerns in the face of persistent
and growing frequency of revolving senior officials. "[T]he normalcy of moving
from an administrative agency to the financial sector [and the reverse] and the
sheer numbers of people making the transition imply that the regulators and the
representatives of financial institutions are really the same people, only at differ-
ent points in their careers." 2 16
210. Kwak, supra note 81, at 79 ("I use the label cultural capture for this phenomenon: cultural
because it operates through a set of shared but not explicitly stated understandings about the world;
capture because it can produce the same outcome as traditional capture - regulatory actions that serve
the ends of industry."). Kwak observes that although cultural capture is distinct from the more
traditional notion of capture being driven by economic self-interest, it is just as powerful in how it can
impact belief systems. Id. at 79; see also Baxter, supra note 51, at 183 (noting that regulation is shaped
by the background, education, experiences and intermingling shared by those presiding over the
formation of public policy).
211. See Kwak, supra note 81, at 79 ("It contributes to the ongoing contest between rival ideological
systems, which helps to shape the belief systems of governmental actors.").
212. See Gadinis, supra note 108, at 725 ("The 'revolving door' between an agency and the industry
it supervises may also affect regulatory performance through socialization mechanisms.").
213. See id. at 725-26 ("Theorists have long argued that regulators with industry origins have
become 'socialized' toward that industry's concerns and aspirations, carrying that perspective into their
regulatory tasks.").
214. See Engstrom, supra note 107, at 32 ("Thus, an industry can somehow convince regulators to
think like it.").
215. Kwak, supra note 81, at 80.
216. Id. at 83.
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Gormley provides the seminal study of cognitive and cultural capture involv-
ing his analysis of the background of commissioners of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) with their voting behavior as a commis-
sioner.2 17 Overall, the study found that commissioners appointed from the indus-
try were more likely to vote for matters that supported industry interests218 and
that votes on particular issues that could be classified as pro-regulatory or deregu-
latory were explainable by whether the matter helped the industry and not by
whether the commissioner was being philosophically consistent.2 19 Cohen's later,
more extensive study of the voting behavior of FCC commissioners provided im-
portant qualifications to Gormley's findings.220 Using many more variables,
Cohen found that, although those with industry experience before becoming a
commissioner were fourteen percent more supportive of industry positions than
commissioners without any prior industry experience,22 1 the factor which is far
more predictive of a commissioner's voting vis-a-vis an industry-preferred posi-
tion is the party of the appointing President and how dominant the controlling
party is in the U.S. House of Representatives when the commissioner votes.222 Of
particular interest, a strong predictor of supporting industry positions appears in
the case of commissioner votes in his or her last year of service when the commis-
sioner, regardless of industry association when appointed, assumes employment
in the industry at the end of the commissioner's tenure.223
True, we might expect that a commissioner or division head with prior sus-
tained employment with the regulated may find their views at least temporized by
interactions with SEC commissioners or personnel. They may even feel pressure
to conform to the SEC's culture favoring certain pro-regulatory conventions and
attitudes. Nonetheless, the "creeping colonization of ideas"22 4 is particularly dan-
gerous when dealing with financial regulation due to the close relationship
between the regulators and the regulated.225 Often, financial regulation is both
"highly discretionary," and relationships are necessarily "continuous," due to
ongoing monitoring of institutions.22 Some commentators have expressed con-
cern that the disparity between agency and industry resources may add to this
217. See William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 665, 681-82 (1979).
218. See id. at 679.
219. See id. at 681.
220. See Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Dynamics of the "Revolving Door" on the FCC, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI.
689, 689-90 (1986).
221. See id. at 694.
222. See id. at 701-05.
223. See id. at 695-96.
224. Engstrom, supra note 107, at 32.
225. See Baxter, supra note 51, at 187 ("One need not be totally cynical to recognize that the highly
discretionary and continuous nature of bank regulation is dependent on and nurtures an environment in
which the regulators and the regulated are engaged in such close, daily relationships as to nurture intense
mutual empathy-perhaps even a kind of 'transference'-between the two sides.").
226. See id.
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vulnerability because the SEC may be willing to accept fewer sanctions or, con-
versely, more settlements so that they can focus on other matters.227 Further, this
gap in resources appears to be growing.228 It also should be noted that "regulators
are human beings and are subject to the same set of cognitive shortcomings as
other human beings," and the environment in which their beliefs are formed may
have a large impact on the substance of those views.229 Many scholars have
explored behavioral biases in financial regulation,230 as well as in other indus-
tries.231 Cognitive biases on the part of a division head poses serious concerns
when the division head is deeply involved in agenda setting-thereby shaping
approaches to regulatory or enforcement strategies-and more broadly when par-
ticipating in the highly collaborative culture that surrounds so much of the work
of the SEC.
B. THE SEC'S COLLABORATIVE CULTURE
With this background about director appointments in mind, we turn next to
how revolver directors may affect SEC decisionmaking. As observed earlier,
prior revolving door studies have limitations. They not only are narrowly focused
on enforcement but also overlook the collaborative-team approach that is present
with so much of what the SEC does. Focusing on the rent-seeking hypothesis as
applied to SEC staffers overlooks the collaborative and supervisory culture in
which individual staff members operate.
To illustrate the staff's collaborative role, consider the process by which the
SEC considers and issues no-action letters. Since its formation, the SEC has pro-
vided informal guidance to the regulated communities. 23 2 The most visible233
227. See Gadinis, supra note 108, at 724 ("The first concern is that the SEC has limited bureaucratic
resources, and thus might be willing to accept a less aggressive settlement against defendants with
sophisticated legal teams in order to turn its attention to other cases.").
228. See id. (citing various GAO Reports regarding SEC operations).
229. See Kwak, supra note 81, at 76.
230. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1,
20-36 (2003) (applying the field of behavioral economics to "catalog a series of biases that SEC officials
may face" that can impact regulatory decisions).
231. Gadinis, supra note 108, at 726 nn. 169-71 (citing various studies regarding how socialization
impacted decisions of "FCC Commissioners, central bankers, and state insurance commissioners"); see
also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 553-55 (2002) ("We contend that bad public policy can often be traced to
flaws in human judgment and choice among governmental actors. Aligning and channeling self-interest
toward pursuing the public interest will not guarantee good policy outcomes.").
232. See e.g., Robert M. Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation Under the Securities
Laws, 26 IOWA L. REv. 241 (1941) (providing an early review of the SEC's mediums to give informal
guidance). Today, this is formally contemplated in 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2018).
233. Adoption of Section 200.81, Concerning Public Availability of Requests for No-Action and
Interpretative Letters and the Responses Thereto by the Commission's Staff, and Amendment of Section
200.80, Securities Act Release No. 5098, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
77,921 (Oct. 29, 1970) (announcing a policy that thereafter no-action letters are to be publicly
accessible).
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form is through its very active no-action letter process where the SEC's staff
responds to individual inquiries regarding the staff's interpretation of the federal
securities laws. No-action letters are compliance-oriented and customarily reflect
only the view of the SEC's staff, with the consequential effect that they are bind-
ing only as to the requesting party for the very transaction carefully set forth in
the request. Nonetheless, no-action letters are a substantial component of the
"lore" of the securities laws including even as guidance in private and public liti-
gation as reflecting policies and practices followed by the staff. Most no-action
letters are issued by the Division of Corporation Finance, but other divisions
engage in the practice where internal procedures require that the requesting letter
is directed to the Chief Counsel within the division having responsibility for that
particular area of the securities laws. For example, a request involving mutual
funds would be within the Division of Investment Management.
The no-action letter process has changed little over the many decades of its ex-
istence.234 The Chief Counsel assigns the letter to a staff attorney to research the
questions raised and to prepare a draft response.235 The response and supporting
memorandum of authorities are reviewed by the attorney's supervisor.236 The
work products are reviewed by several levels within the division. In most cases,
the SEC's response is set forth in two or three paragraphs. This process is a highly
collaborative effort.237
SEC enforcement activities, much like the no-action letter process, are at the
staff level, and most parts of the enforcement process are outside the immediate
purview of the appointed commissioners. However, most enforcement efforts are
collaborative with the staff subject to multiple levels of oversight by different
supervisors.238 Targets for possible investigation come from a variety of sour-
ces;239 the decision to launch an inquiry must be approved by the Associate
Director, the Regional Director, or a Unit Chief within the Division of
Enforcement.240 SEC procedures distinguish between informal and formal inves-
tigations, with the latter occurring only with the approval of the Director of the
234. See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1986)
(providing a close description of the process as well as the three forms of a response: favorable, adverse,
no response on the merits); Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC
No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 921 (1998)
(examining critically the no-action letter process and analysis of impact of no-action letters in the
courts).
235. See Lemke, supra note 234, at 1027-28.
236. See id. at 1029.
237. See id. ("A proposed response that involves a novel or significant issue may be reviewed on
several levels within the division or by the Commission itself before the response is issued.").
238. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, DIVISION OF ENF'T, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (2017)
[hereinafter SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL] (describing in detail the various considerations that underlie
the many facets of the enforcement actions by the SEC).
239. See COX ET. AL., supra note 156, at 828 (noting that sources include whistleblowers, news
reports, and periodic reviews of market professionals by the SEC).
240. SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 238, at § 2.3.1 (describing the formalities to open a
"matter of inquiry"). Similar approval levels are required to open an "investigation" or even close a
matter of inquiry. Id. at § 2.3.2.
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Division of Enforcement, based on a memorandum prepared by staff and
reviewed by supervisors requesting a formal order; 2 4 1 the principal effect of a for-
mal as opposed to informal investigation is that, thereafter, with the approval of
the Director, the SEC can issue subpoenas to obtain information relevant to the
investigation's focus. The commencement of an enforcement action must be
authorized by the commissioners; 242 even though this process, as discussed ear-
lier, follows the staff first having obtained the approval of the investigation by the
Associate Director or Regional Director, the recommendation to the commis-
sioners is made by the Division of Enforcement after consultation with the Office
of Chief Counsel, the Office of the General Counsel, and any other interested di-
vision.24 3 Most enforcement actions result in settlements, which must be
approved by the commissioners. Staff are called on in drafting a settlement agree-
ment to consult with senior managers, the Office of Chief Counsel within the
division, and, when appropriate, the Office of General Counsel.244 Cooperation
agreements including deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements must
be approved by the Director of the Division of Enforcement. 2 45 These multiple
levels of review and approval pose serious challenges for an individual wishing
to act in accordance with the rent-seeking hypothesis. Indeed, Director Two was
skeptical that staff were able to engage in rent-seeking activities at the SEC as a
consequence of revolving door practices because the agency's internal processes
were rich with multiple individuals involved and multiple levels of review. There
are lots of steps within the process so that people are rarely working on their own.
Director Two felt that this made rent-seeking a difficult strategy to pursue.
In addition, the directors of other SEC divisions do a wide variety of other
team-oriented activities in their jobs. For example, Director One recalls many in-
ternal discussions at the SEC about how to best implement initiatives that would
respond to calls for reform that came out of earlier studies. Director One spent a
good deal of time with career SEC employees fashioning appropriate responses.
Director One also held many meetings with private-sector parties that were inter-
ested in making the system better.
Agenda control was a different issue. Director Two acknowledged that in some
situations there is a zone of discretion for the director or deputy director. In these
situations, Director Two admitted that it can make a difference who is making the
decision, but in limited circumstances. Director Two devoted a good deal of time
to agenda setting. Directors also spent time in industry outreach efforts as well as
internal matters. In outreach efforts, Director Two described the time demands of
attending and participating in many programs that brought the director into con-
tact with industry groups and their lawyers. These contacts may potentially have
affected the SEC's agenda.
241. See id. §§ 2.3.2, 2.3.4.
242. See id. § 2.5.1.
243. See id. § 2.5.2.
244. See id. § 2.5.1.
245. See id. § 6.2.1 (the approval can also be by a senior officer designated by the Director).
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Director Three devoted a good deal of time to many administrative interfa-
ces, most importantly working with the Chair to establish and implement the
Chair's priorities. During Director Three's time at the agency, agency agenda
implementation included a substantial involvement of the General Counsel as
that office has a broad overview and involvement in all aspects of the SEC
operations. Rulemaking particularly provides substantial interaction with the
Office of General Counsel. Director Three suggested that directors and
deputy directors had some ability to influence practices and policies within
their division; that is, directors can exert agenda control, but there were few
instances where staff recommendations were changed (although Director
Three went on to say that there were initial consultations with staff before
they began work on projects). Directors have the power to change recommen-
dations, and are deeply involved in agenda setting, but it is a collegial process
overseen by the Chair's office.
Director Three emphasized that working collaboratively within the agency
consumed a fair amount of time. As a division head, Director Three reviewed
memoranda and proposals on rulemaking, rule interpretation, and the examina-
tion of regional offices. Director Three observed that all directors spend a fair
amount of time reviewing the work of the staff in their performance of two
major tasks of the division: rulemaking and interpretations. Director Three
noted that there were few instances where major changes in either rulemaking
or interpretations that were supported by the staff were not made. The consen-
sus among the directors we interviewed is that any director depends heavily on
recommendations of the staff. The directors interviewed observed that they
expended a lot of effort on congressional interactions. This was time consum-
ing for senior staff because of the importance of the legislative process in the
workings of the agency.
Deputy Directors were another important managerial player. Director Two
remembered that the role of deputy directors and associate directors was to
make sure the "trains run on time," that is, to make sure that projects moved
along in their areas. Such direct reports also handled the evaluation of individ-
ual staffers' work. The SEC has long had a formal process for such reviews
and the interviewed directors reported that much of this was carried out by
their direct reports. The process is collegial and overseen by the Chair's
office.
From the above, we see that the day-to-day regulatory and enforcement
activities of the SEC are highly collaborative, with lots of input from all lev-
els and with the engagement of directors, their direct reports, and the staff. At
the same time, division heads are the leaders of their respective division and
that position accords the director great influence on the division's agenda and
direction policy might take that division or the SEC. Although the collabora-
tive culture of the SEC should dampen considerably the angst caused by staff
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revolvers, division heads have an important voice in shaping the course the SEC
pursues on individual regulatory and enforcement matters. As the data discussed
earlier reflect, we now see a dramatic increase in the overall percentage of divi-
sion heads from the private sector, such that their now-strong presence at the SEC
raises fears of cultural capture. Possible antidotes to this existing practice are dis-
cussed in the next Part.
VII. MODERATING THE RISK OF COGNITIVE-CULTURAL CAPTURE
The transition from the Carter to the Reagan Administration led to changes
at the SEC as John Shad replaced Harold Williams as Chair. As we have seen,
both Chairs were in the vanguard of what soon became the new normal in
appointing individuals from the private sector to lead key SEC divisions, rather
than continuing the half-century practice of elevating career staffers to lead
divisions. What separates Williams from Shad is that Williams believed the
mission of the SEC could best be advanced by leaders from the private sector
who possessed a deep understanding of rapidly evolving changes in capital
markets. In contrast, Shad's appointment of Fedders was responsive to pressure
to muzzle SEC enforcement that had become an issue in the political campaign
just won by Reagan.
The Williams and Shad illustrations reflect how two starkly different
objectives can be served when the SEC Chair eschews career staffers and
appoints division heads from private practice; indeed, the Williams and
Shad illustrations invite us to consider what legal or organizational structure
exists or can be introduced to lead to outcomes that advance the missions of
the SEC to protect investors and nurture capital markets. Restated, what can
be done to prevent this heretofore unexplored dimension of the SEC's
revolving door from providing a broad entryway through which the regu-
lated can capture its regulator? In this Part, we consider possible mecha-
nisms to address the risk of capture posed by the growing practice of SEC
division heads coming from private practice. Such mechanisms include judi-
cial review of agency actions, placement of agenda setting elsewhere than
the division head's office, and buffer provided by those who report directly
to the division head.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A natural lawyer-based response to address risks of capture is through judi-
cial review. Courts become entangled in SEC actions. Rules adopted by the
SEC can be judicially reviewed on petition by a person aggrieved by the rule
and the discretion the SEC exercises to settle an enforcement action brought in
the federal court requires the approval of the presiding court. In this respect,
consider the ongoing debate whether SEC enforcement action is uniformly
lax because too many defendants are able to settle their disputes without admit-
ting fault on their part, and any monetary sum is paid by the entity and not
2019] 889
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 107:845
individuals who were engaged in the transaction causing the alleged violation.2 46
In the enforcement realm, whether courts can play a role in addressing weak pros-
ecutions and settlements through judicial review of SEC actions depends on
whether courts take the approach employed by the Second Circuit, one of the
most recent circuits to consider this question. In SEC v. Citigroup Global
Markets, the district court rejected a settlement between the SEC and the defend-
ant and set the dispute for trial.247 Indeed, Judge Rakoff held that the settlement
was not adequate because, among other bases, even though serious misconduct
was alleged in the complaint and the settlement included a $95 million payment
by the corporation (and hence indirectly borne by its shareholders), the defendant
246. See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman, SEC's Khuzami Defends "Admit-Nor-Deny" Settlements, WALL
ST. J., (June 9, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702040120045
77072462404708198 [https://perma.cc/77H7-TFXQ]. Following Judge Rakoff's decision in Citigroup,
SEC Enforcement Chief Robert Khuzami argued that "pursuing litigation solely to obtain an admission
of guilt [was] unlikely to result in greater penalties." Id. According to Khuzami, the SEC has a policy of
only settling cases it "'reasonably' expects to win at trial." Id. Khuzami noted that companies would
refuse to admit guilt in settlements because private litigation would soon follow. See Priyah Kaul, Admit
or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC's "Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny" Policy, 48 MICH. J. L. REF. 535,
535 (2015) (arguing that the SEC's "no-admit" policy fails to serve the deterrent function of securities
regulation, is too ambiguous, affords too much discretion to the SEC, and does not sufficiently punish
wrongdoers, and as a result, the policy reduces agency transparency and accountability-and,
ultimately, credibility).
Brandon Garret argues that the corporate entity allows individuals to escape liability because the
corporation, which cannot physically receive or serve jail time, takes most of the blame and that even
when individuals are charged, the prosecutions are either unsuccessful or result in light sentences.
Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2015). Garrett
concludes by discussing three types of reform to enhance individual criminal accountability: (i) enacting
new substantive crimes; (ii) making legislative changes, e.g. extending statutes of limitations or
tightening sentencing rules; and (iii) using corporate settlements to change the incentives for the firm's
employees and officers. Id. at 1796.
For a discussion of how the SEC has implemented its new policy of requiring some defendants to
admit wrongdoing along with their settlements, see generally Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
An Empirical Study of Admissions in SEC Settlements, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2018). Winship and
Robbennolt observe that the number of settlements including admissions has been low, and that many of
such settlements were against individuals rather than entities. Id. at 1. They also distinguish between
factual admissions and admissions of violations or state of mind, stating that factual admissions are
relatively weak but still important in building a public account of the events. Id. at 47-48.
Samuel Buell acknowledges that public lawsuits are not brought primarily for compensation, but for
their deterrent effects, and he analyzes the deterrent effects of the three aspects of enforcement
settlements: liability, admission, and remedy. Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of
Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CiN. L. REV. 505, 506 (2013) (acknowledging that
public lawsuits are not brought primarily for compensation but for their deterrent effects). Buell further
argues that admissions should be included in settlements, as their exclusion reduces the public benefits
of government enforcement. Id.
Lyndon Groff notes that "no-admit" consent judgments are not necessarily effective in deterring
future misconduct, even though they do reduce the costs and uncertainty of litigation. Lyndon Groff, Is
Too Big to Fail Too Big to Confess?: Scrutinizing the SEC's "No Admit" Consent Judgment Proposals,
54 B.C. L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2013). He expresses concern over the possibility that the settlements could
conceal the full truth. Id. at 1727. Nevertheless, he argues that the SEC, not the courts, is in the best
position to assess whether settlements in fact promote the public interest and to implement suitable
changes. Id.
247. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing and the settlement did not identify any
culpable company employee. 248 The Second Circuit vacated the order, holding
that the trial court should not assess the adequacy of an agency's settlement.249
Judge Rakoff had questioned the size of the fine to be imposed relative to other
fines the SEC had recently extracted from other investment banks and whether
the fine was too slight to provide a meaningful deterrent. Such comparative ques-
tions under the Second Circuit's formulation of the review standard went beyond
the range of permissible inputs. Indeed, the court set forth very limited areas for
review of a consent decree:
A court evaluating a proposed S.E.C. consent decree for fairness and reason-
ableness should, at a minimum, assess (1) the basic legality of the decree;
(2) whether the terms of the decree, including its enforcement mechanism, are
clear; (3) whether the consent decree reflects a resolution of the actual claims
in the complaint; and (4) whether the consent decree is tainted by improper
collusion or corruption of some kind.... The primary focus of the inquiry ...
should be on ensuring the consent decree is procedurally proper, using objec-
tive measures similar to the factors set out above, taking care not to infringe on
the S.E.C.'s discretionary authority to settle on a particular set of terms. 250
The court held that the SEC is entitled to Chevron deference on whether the
settlement it struck is in the public interest.25 1 Moreover, the court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by withholding approval solely on the ground it
disagreed with how the SEC exercised its judgment but made no finding that the
public interest was disserved by the settlement.252
A conflicting approach involving the SEC was taken thirty years earlier by the
Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Randolph,2 53 on facts similar to Citigroup Global. In
Randolph, the district judge had rejected the settlement, reasoning the sanction
was not in the public interest because it did not require the defendant to pay pre-
judgment interest on gains derived through its violation.254 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that the district court should, upon being per-
suaded that the remedy under the facts is adequate, defer to the SEC regarding
whether the sanction imposed was in the public interest. 2 5 5 Thus, in the Ninth
Circuit, adequacy was a central consideration when approving enforcement set-
tlements. Its holding on this issue mirrors the position of other circuits in assess-
ing settlements supported by regulatory agencies. 256 Even though Citigroup
248. Id.
249. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 752 F.3d 285, 294 (2d. Cir. 2014).
250. Id. at 294-95 (internal citations omitted).
251. Id. at 296.
252. Id. at 297.
253. 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).
254. Id. at 528.
255. Id. at 530.
256. For a wide-ranging-but penetrating-critique of Citigroup Global Markets, see generally
Theodore D. Edwards, Of Truth, Pragmatism, and Sour Grapes: The Second Circuit's Decision in SEC
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Global and Randolph each reversed their respective district courts and upheld the
settlement supported by the SEC, a wide gulf separates their approaches.
We do not believe the quest for the public interest, one of the criteria accepted
even by the Second Circuit, should be divorced from considering the settlement's
terms in light of such factors as the strength of the government's case and the
harm to the public interest. Simply stated, an adequate settlement is consistent
with the public interest and an inadequate settlement is not. With the predomi-
nance of settlements in SEC enforcement actions, a robust review standard con-
sistent with Randolf is essential to addressing any fears of industry bias.
Moreover, Chevron deference is a doctrine founded in the context of administra-
tive rulemaking where the agency's expertise has a stronger foundation, espe-
cially in arcane technical areas, 25 7 so that deference is less applicable in the
litigation arena where the presiding court is similarly disabled.
At the same time, the safeguard provided by judicial review to curb agency
capture in SEC enforcement actions is not present when such enforcement occurs
not in the courts but within the SEC's administrative procedures. The SEC has
discretion to pursue enforcement actions within its internal administrative process
for which there is no similar judicial review of settlements reached with the re-
spondent in such an administrative procedure. 2 58 The antidote for any industry
bias within the administrative enforcement arena would thus need to rely on other
strategies advanced here.
Another dimension of SEC discretion in enforcement is the granting of waivers
of provisions that disqualify individuals from certain regulated activities if they
are the subject of an SEC order. These so-called "bad boy" provisions both pro-
tect investors from someone who has been successfully prosecuted for violating
securities laws and add immensely to the deterrence of violating securities laws.
Bad boy provisions make unavailable important regulatory dispensations to indi-
viduals or entities that are subject to an order by judgement or settlement arising
from a violation of the securities laws. 2 59 However, the SEC has the authority to
waive bad boy consequences and conditions, by granting a waiver on there being
v. Citigroup Global Markets, 65 DUKE L. J. 1241 (2016) (pointing out that, in addition to being out of
step with review standards in other circuits, the Second Circuit ignored other important issues such as
serious Article III concerns that arise if the court is expected to defer to the settlement to exercise its
authority to grant an order).
257. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing that
deference be given to administrative agencies with respect to their regulatory actions).
258. See generally Danne L. Johnson, SEC Settlements: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 727, 645 (2007) (reviewing administrative enforcement processes
available to the SEC in which there is no judicial approval of settlements); see also David Zaring,
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEx. L. REV. 102 (2016). Data support the view that the SEC
pursues before its administrative tribunal weaker cases that have a lower enforcement priority. See
Steven Choi & Adam Pritchard, The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical
Assessment, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2017).
259. For example, the SEC accords great freedom with an issuer's registration of publicly offered
securities if the issuer is a "well-known seasoned issuer." See, e.g., FORM S-3: REGISTRATION
STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/forms-3.pdf. However, the regulatory dispensations are not available if the issuer is an
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"good cause" for doing so. 260 One study of the 201 waivers granted during nearly
a twelve-year period found that eighty-two were granted to large financial
firms.261 The predominance of waivers to such firms likely reflects that large de-
fendant organizations operate through multiple divisions so that violations com-
mitted in one division-for example-trading of securities, are unlikely to
suggest any risk of misconduct in another division-for instance, underwriting.
Nonetheless, that large organizations appear to enjoy more influence than indi-
vidual actors or small firms continue to engender disquiet, such that concerns for
capture lurk in the shadows of the predominance of waivers being garnered by
large financial institutions.26 2 No court has yet had the opportunity to review any
such waivers; however, if such a review were to occur it would appear that the
highly deferential position taken in Citigroup Global Markets would be applica-
ble so that rejecting a waiver would be unlikely.
Even though the SEC enjoys deference when its rules are challenged in the
courts, in recent years there have been several instances in which its rulemaking
was struck down because of the agency's failure to consider a rule's impact on
"efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 263 Most prominent among the
SEC's recent reversals is that suffered in Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the
court held the SEC acted inappropriately by not fully considering the costs and
benefits of the proposed rule. 264 Although such case holdings pose serious head-
winds for the SEC when engaged in rulemaking, the winds do not fill the sails
that will lead the SEC to adopt a more aggressive regulatory position. With one
exception, discussed below, there is simply no SEC rulemaking jurisprudence
where the agency has been reversed for a rule that has not gone far enough, or for
that matter, further than it did. That is, with a single exception, successful chal-
lenges to SEC rulemaking have been by those targeted by the challenged rule
who successfully argued that the SEC did not reasonably develop its case for
increasing the industry's regulatory burden. The lone exception to this outcome
followed Congress's enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA),265 mandating that every federal agency "to the fullest extent possi-
ble" interpret and administer federal laws "in accordance with the policies" set
"ineligible issuer" because it is, for example, subject in the prior three years to an SEC enforcement
order. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2018).
260. See, e.g., Raymond James Fin., Inc., [2011 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,743,
2011 WL 12888019 (July 1, 2011) (waiver granted to permit respondent to preserve status as a well-
known seasoned issuer).
261. Velikonja, supra note 120, at 1116.
262. See Gadinis, supra note 108, at 725 (discussing apparent bias favoring larger broker-dealers in
enforcement of the securities laws). The SEC discloses only grants of waivers and not requests for
waivers; thus, it is not possible to assess more fully any disparity in treatment in granting waivers
between individual violators and large financial institutions. Velikonja, supra note 120, at 1136.
263. See, e.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
264. 647 F.3d 1144, 1153-55 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
265. Pub. L. No. 91-190, §§ 102, 205, 83 Stat. 852, 853, 855 (1970) (NEPA's most significant
requirement is that all executive federal agencies prepare environmental assessments and environmental
impact statements).
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forth in NEPA. Believing that the SEC's rulemaking in response to NEPA was
weak, the Natural Resources Defense Council sought review of the SEC's action.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,266 the court faulted the SEC
for failing to develop an adequate record supporting the modest regulatory
changes it adopted in response to NEPA and ordered the SEC to conduct further
rulemaking. Thereafter, the SEC developed an extensive record, but its position
remained unchanged: it reasoned that NEPA did not change the historical focus
of disclosure of economically significant information.2 6 7 No further litigation
ensued on the possible impact of NEPA on the mission of the SEC.
Review standards for SEC regulations that have developed focus on whether
the position taken in a given rule is justified. Thus, we may conclude that regula-
tory asymmetry exists within the SEC rulemaking orbit. The regulated have
enjoyed success by complaining that the SEC insufficiently considered the bur-
dens of its rule on the regulated, but there is, at best, too thin a record for the
intended beneficiaries of a rule to meet with success in arguing the SEC should
have gone further. And even if investors were successful in attacking a rule for
not going far enough, the "victory" may be hollow. The SEC may decide that no
rule on that topic will be forthcoming, as it did after the Business Roundtable de-
cision in which the industry successfully attacked a rule providing shareholders
with modest access to the process of nominating directors for election to the
board of public companies-a total win for the regulated.26 8
B. MOVE AGENDA SETTING OUTSIDE THE SEC
As seen earlier, division heads can derive a good deal of their influence by their
role in setting the agenda for their division as well as the overall agenda of the
Commission. To the extent a division's agenda is controlled or influenced by
others through collaboration, any harmful bias on the part of a division head is
weakened. Thus, one strategy that could ameliorate the risks of capture through
directors' revolving door practices is to locate agenda setting outside the
Commission.2 69 This is not a radical solution, and regularly happens with
Congress's amendments to the securities laws that necessarily call for agency
rulemaking to implement Congress's vision. Recent examples are the multiple
rulemaking initiatives Congress set in motion with the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the JOBS Act. Each of these
266. 389 F. Supp. 689, 701 (D.D.C. 1974).
267. Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (Nov. 6, 1975) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239-40, 249).
268. See 647 F.3d at 1146-48.
269. Agenda setting is an important source of power in the formulation of public policy.
Accordingly, it has been much studied and discussed in the context of the legislative process. See
generally David W. Rohde, Edward H. Stiglitz & Barry R. Weingast, Dynamic Theory of Congressional
Organization (Feb. 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://web.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-
bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/rsw_dynamics_1302171.pdf (providing an extensive review
of the literature addressing how Congress allocates positive and negative legislative powers). How
agenda setting occurs within agencies, however, is an understudied topic.
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legislative actions introduced dramatic changes to the federal securities laws that,
in many instances, required the SEC to engage in extensive rulemaking to imple-
ment Congress's vision. But, in a few isolated instances, the SEC's response
sometimes reflects the time-worn expression, "You can lead a horse to water, but
you can't make it drink." For example, Congress enacted section 404(b) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to require the auditors of all SEC reporting companies to
attest to management's assessment of internal controls. However, for several
years following SOX's passage, in response to industry pressure, the SEC repeat-
edly extended its initial temporary exemption from the provision for small public
companies, essentially excusing sixty percent of all reporting companies from
what Congress had mandated.2 70 With the exemption well ingrained, the
Congress made it permanent in 2010.271 In another example of SEC lethargy,
Dodd-Frank section 971 G amended section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act to
authorize the SEC to adopt rules providing mechanism whereby shareholders
could nominate individuals to stand for election in public companies. The SEC
quickly pounced on its new authority, but did so with a rule so limited in its possi-
ble application as to render it nearly unusable. Despite the weak threat it posed to
public companies' historical control of the nominating process the SEC's rule
was rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as being arbitrary and
capricious for failing to fully consider the rule's possible burdens.272 Even though
the circuit court's decision was likely vulnerable on many bases,273 the SEC never
sought support from the Solicitor General for a review before the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the SEC never again returned to exercising the express statutory
authority to provide a means for shareholders of public companies to nominate
directors. These two examples reflect that Congress can indeed lead, but remains
far short of being able to command the agency to act.
Congressional oversight can be an effective tool to influence agency action. In
broad terms, congressional oversight occurs in response to scandals or crises
("fire alarm" oversight) or to prevent problems before they occur ("police patrol"
270. COX ET AL., supra note 156, at 598-99.
271. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
989G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1948 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(c) (2012)) (adding section 404(c) to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic
Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers, Securities Act Release No. 9142, Exchange Act Release No. 62,914,
75 Fed. Reg. 57,385, 57,386 (Sept. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 249) (formalizing the
dispensation for auditor attestation for small issuers).
272. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reasoning the SEC
"inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits" in adopting Rule 14a-11 to
authorize shareholders meeting certain requirements to nominate a small portion of the board of
directors).
273. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the
D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012) (reviewing
judicial and legislative authorities to conclude that SEC's rulemaking authority is not conditioned on
formal cost-benefit analysis and setting forth strategies the SEC can pursue to nonetheless reduce
reversal of rulemaking in the wake of Business Roundtable).
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oversight).274 Congressional involvement can occur through a variety of media,
ranging from formal hearings to less formal contacts such as discussion between
committee members or members of their staff and agency personnel. Media also
include imposing reporting requirements on the agency, or invoking the investi-
gative efforts of congressional support agencies such as the Government
Accountability Office.
Congressional committees, however, are themselves subject to constraints and
forces that impact congressional oversight.27 5 One obvious concern is the effect
that interest groups may have on a congressional committee or its members' in-
terest in an issue. A further constraint, at least on formal hearings, is that because
committee memberships reflect the interest of a committee member in that com-
mittee's subject, each committee's membership is hardly a microcosm of interest
across Congress. Such divergence of interests or preferences between members
of a committee and Congress naturally leads committees to act strategically when
considering what issues to engage openly, and thus limits the potential areas for
hearings.2 76 Nonetheless, the force of hearings is observable on agency conduct
and informal interactions between committee members or their staffs, and can be
expected to also have an impact on the agency.277 But the overarching concern is
that risks of industry capture may appear on two fronts-at the agency and within
Congress-so that the efficacy of congressional oversight would thus be greatly
compromised.2 78
Dodd-Frank introduced three initiatives that can be seen as Congress's con-
cem with industry capturing the SEC: the creation of an Investor Advocacy
Committee, the Office of the Investor Advocate, and an ombudsman who is
274. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. POL. SCi. 165, 166 (1984).
275. See Kagan, supra note 205, at 2347 (arguing that collective action problems within Congress,
not to mention the necessity of presidential agreement in many instances, necessarily makes meaningful
congressional oversight uncertain to occur). The number of congressional hearings has declined over the
past few decades. See Norman J. Omstein & Thomas E. Mann, When Congress Checks Out, BROOKINGS
(Nov. 1, 2006), https:/www.brookings.edu/opinions/when-congress-checks-out [https://perma.cc/
7DAC-PJF8]; see also Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair "The Broken Branch"?, 89 B.
U. L. REV. 765, 774-75 (2009) (reporting that congressional oversight had, as of the writing of the
article, "reached its nadir during the first six years of the George W. Bush Administration").
276. Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1203-07
(2018).
277. For example, Professor Feinstein examined 14,431 agency infractions, such as instances of
adverse reports of inspector generals. Id. at 1191. He found that a recurrence of the infraction was 18.5%
less likely to occur where there was a congressional hearing within one year of the observed infraction
than in a control group where no hearing occurred. Id. at 1235-36. The data is consistent with the
conclusion that oversight matters. Id. at 1225.
278. See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled
Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1701-02 (2009) (examining the process by which interest groups
capture congressional committees); Seymour Scher, Conditions for Legislative Control, 25 J. POL. 526,
533-34 (1963) (noting that congressional review is weakened when the agency and the involved
members of Congress share a mutually rewarding relationship); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 582-83 (1994) ("There is no
such thing in Washington as a politically 'independent' agency." (footnote omitted)).
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appointed by the Investor Advocate. Each of these steps can be seen as reflecting
the belief that institutionalizing advocacy of a particular point of view within an
agency can address to some extent, forces toward industry capture.2 7 9 The legisla-
tion calls for the Investor Advocate to annually set forth objectives sought by the
office and to report on actions taken during the year. Each of the reports are sent
directly to Congress so that neither is subject to review by the SEC's Chair or her
designate. A review of the Investor Advocate's annual reports reflect that, despite
having a relatively modest-sized staff, the Office of the Investor Advocate has
taken serious positions in a variety of rulemaking and policy discussions in the
years since its creation. The ombudsman also reports directly to Congress and has
the broad mandate to make recommendations on behalf of an individual investor.
These developments may well reflect not only fears of industry capture, but fears
that Congress placed its "thumb on the scale" for investors in light of the tensions
within the SEC's charge when rulemaking to "consider, in addition to the protec-
tion of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation." 280 That is, "efficiency, competition, and capital formation," at
least in combination, can tug in a direction different from that pointed toward in-
vestor protection. 2 81 Nonetheless, an in-house advocate championing specifically
for investor interests can be seen as broadening the inputs surrounding regulatory
and enforcement approaches before a division of the SEC. We believe this can be
an important force to moderate perspectives that may be held by division heads
whose experiences were previously honed by years of representing those regu-
lated by the SEC.
C. SUPPORTING REVOLVER DIRECTORS WITH INTERNAL DEPUTY DIRECTORS
A further moderating force is surrounding division heads when possible with
career staffers. We observe that revolving directors, at least partially, insulate the
SEC from any cultural bias arising from their prior private-sector activities by
regularly surrounding themselves with direct reports-deputy, associate, and as-
sistant directors of their division-that have significant SEC tenures. We
observed this practice by identifying who the direct reports were for each of
the revolvers in our study and then matching for each such report the years of
279. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 62 (2010); see also Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer
Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE, supra note 81, at 365, 365-66.
280. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f),
15 U.S.C. §78(c)(f) (2012).
281. For example, the SEC Small Business Advocate Act of 2016 established the Office of the
Advocate for Small Business Capital Formation as well as an advisory committee focused on facilitating
capital formation by small businesses. SEC Small Business Advocate Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-284, 130
Stat. 1447. One focus of both the Advocate and the committee is advocating against application of
regulations that are deemed overly burdensome for small businesses.
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continuous service with the SEC prior to becoming such a report.282 Recall that
Ed Greene was the first revolver for the Division of Corporation Finance; his five
direct reports averaged nine years of experience at the SEC, with two having an
average tenure at the SEC of over twenty years. The direct reports of the next re-
volver, David Martin, had each served in the SEC more than fourteen years
before being appointed to their office by Martin. And, most recently, Keith
Higgins's direct reports had been at the SEC for an average of 20.5 years. The
tenure of a revolver's direct reports is shorter in the Division of Enforcement; for
example, for a period commensurate with that of Higgin's directorship in
Corporation Finance the average tenure of direct reports is twelve years. We sur-
mise that the shorter tenure of direct reports in Enforcement is due to enforcement
staff having more generalized skills, coupled with the greater private-sector
demand for those skills and allied experiences.
To elaborate, the work of the SEC is highly collaborative with the junior staff's
work involving multiple levels of review by various managers. We earlier
observed that opportunities for harmful rent-seeking by staff members are likely
reduced by the fact that so much of the output of the SEC is formulated in collab-
orative opportunities. We also believe that a revolving director's engagement
with the staff, and particularly those at the senior level (a senior associate, deputy,
or assistant director) who have been with the SEC for an extended period of time
to merit promotion to a supervisory position provides a likely "agency" perspec-
tive on issues within the division.283 Certainly we believe that where there are
multiple such reports to a revolving director, this can be expected to assure a ful-
some discussion of regulatory or enforcement choices and hence a governor on
any possible industry perspective the revolving director may possess. Indeed, we
282. To identify direct reports, we relied on a variety of sources, including the annual reports made
each year by the SEC. We focused on who was a direct report to a revolver the year following the
revolver's assumption of a directorship. Thus, if a revolver assumed her office in 2001, we identified
who reported to her in 2002. The one-year lag reflects our belief that who is a direct report a year after a
revolver assumes a position is more likely to reflect the director's free choice than who that director
might have inherited upon her appointment.
We determined the SEC tenure of each direct report using two sources. Our first source is the
comprehensive government database-Buzzfeed-which lists each year that a government employee, at
an agency such as the SEC, was employed. Buzzfeed is an electronic dataset of all full-time government
employees from 1974-2016. This data is derived from the Office of Personnel Management (U.S.
Federal Government) CPDF-EHRI personnel database of all federal employees and was provided by
Professor John de Figueiredo of Duke Law School. The data is described more fully in Alex Bolton et
al., Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government 50 & t.B12 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,932, 2019) (on file with authors). We gathered information
about director reports' tenure by searching within the Buzzfeed subset for the SEC using the direct
report's name and year of beginning work as a direct report per the heuristic used in this study described
within section V.A. That database, however, did have some null responses. Therefore, we also turned to
alternative sources, including SEC news releases, to provide the missing information. We set aside from
our determination of averages any direct report we were unable to determine reliably their length of
continuous service at the SEC.
283. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard Revesz, Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 81, at 420 (observing that regular contact with staff can
influence positions held by agency heads).
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believe that the practice of combining revolving directors with SEC-seasoned
direct reports is likely optimal. This combination brings the deep knowledge and
understanding of contemporary challenges and practices in securities markets
possessed by the revolver with career personnel whose perspective is shaped by
their years of being a government regulator.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that prior studies of the SEC and revolving staff,
especially those focusing on its enforcement activities, provide an incomplete,
partial view of the revolving door phenomenon. We have demonstrated that it is
unlikely that many of the alleged rent-seeking behaviors that are the focus of
those prior studies actually occur, at least in part, because of the collaborative na-
ture of many of the activities that take place at the SEC. Multiple layers of review
and numerous exchanges among SEC personnel are likely to weed out rent-seek-
ing actions by rogue actors.
We nonetheless raise what we believe is a far greater concern with the revolv-
ing door: its application to SEC division heads. Ours is the first study of how the
practice of appointing division heads has evolved over the past few decades. We
identify multiple forces that have combined to make it so that today division
heads are regularly appointed from the private sector, specifically from those who
counsel the regulated. We believe we are correct in being concerned about the
potential for agenda control by division directors and the SEC's general counsel,
and the existence of a cultural bias that arises out of these individuals' exposure
to corporate clients. These top managers frequently determine what issues are
considered and what issues are not, raising the likelihood that they may be subject
to a cultural bias regarding the appropriate directions to be taken by the SEC.
Although we see this as an important area for further research, we also note that
the problem may be mitigated by the current practice, employed by many divi-
sion directors, of recruiting deputy directors with many years of SEC staff experi-
ence as their principal lieutenants.
Nonetheless, we are cautiously optimistic that the new normal in making divi-
sion heads appointments is the best approach. Our reasons for this belief mirror
the wisdom of a key contribution of the SEC Special Study, discussed earlier,
that effective regulation calls for the leadership of the SEC to have a deep and
acute understanding of current developments in world capital markets. This is
even more important today than it was in the era when the Special Study was hav-
ing its impact on the SEC's agenda; today's capital markets are more fragmented,
financial products are more diverse, and financial practices and developments are
changing more rapidly, with each of these happening with less transparency
because of the tremendous growth in private markets for trading and capital for-
mation. To be sure, the SEC has a dedicated and knowledgeable staff, but the best
knowledge is, as is frequently stated, "on the street." Moreover, our study yields
no measurable evidence that cultural bias has placed a heavy industry thumb on
the scale.
2019] 899
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
The unease we have with the regulated companies' former counselors being at
the helms of the SEC's key divisions is salved by our data presented earlier that
division heads are surrounded by not years, but now decades, of collective regula-
tory experience in their direct reports. This factor is especially important within
the collegial collaborative culture that pervades the SEC's work. Moreover, we
are heartened by the dialogue within the SEC that flows from a vibrant, well-
staffed Office of the Investor Advocate, discussed earlier. Our study supports the
office's existence and hopefully points a way forward for the Investor Advocate
to raise alternative regulatory and enforcement approaches where needed.
Similarly, Congress's important watchdog function, we hope, can also serve as
an important check on cultural bias, especially in agenda setting within the
agency. Finally, in combination we have personally known a high proportion of
the division heads since the mid-1980s. Neither of us is identified with the regu-
lated, and we like to think of ourselves as consistent spokesmen for the public in-
terest that surrounds securities regulations issues. From this perspective, we do
believe new directors take on government service because they are similarly spir-
ited. Nonetheless, they, like we, should have a high consciousness that from
whence they came may beget bias in their regulatory agenda which may not be
congruent with the public interest.
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APPENDIX I: HISTORICAL DATA ON SEC DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL
APPOINTMENTS OVER TIME
(Revolver Appointments in Italics) 28 4
A. GENERAL COUNSEL
284. We compiled Appendix I according to the methodology outlined in section V.A. of this Article.
SEC General Counsel
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
1934-1954
John J. Bums 1934 Associate Judge - Massachusetts Superior Court
Allen E. 1936 Assistant General Counsel - SEC
Throop
Chester T. 1938 Assistant General Counsel - SEC
Lane
Roger S. Foster 1948 Solicitor - SEC
William H. 1953 Partner - Cummings & Lockwood LLC
Timbers
1955-1975
Thomas G. 1956 Insufficient Information Available
Meeker
Walter P. North 1960 Associate General Counsel - SEC
Peter A. 1961 Private Practice in Chicago
Dammann
Philip A. 1963 Director of Trading and Exchanges - SEC
Loomis, Jr.
George (G.) 1971 Partner - Winston & Strawn LLP
Bradford Cook
Lawrence 1973 Partner - Cant, Taylor, Haverstock, Beardsley &
Nerheim Gray
Harvey Pitt 1975 Executive Assistant to the Chair - SEC;
Chief Counsel of Division of Market Regulation -
SEC
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SEC General Counsel
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
1976-1996
Ralph Ferrera 1978 Executive Assistant to the Chair - SEC
Edward F. 1981 Director of Corporation Finance - SEC
Greene
Daniel L. 1983 Executive Assistant to the Chair - SEC
Goelzer
James R. Doty 1990 Partner - Baker Botts LLP
Simon Lorne 1993 Partner - Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
Richard Walker 1996 Regional Director of the Northeast Regional Office -
SEC
1997-2017
Harvey 1998 Professor - Columbia Law School
Goldschmid
David M. 2000 Partner - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Door
Becker LLP
Deputy General Counsel - SEC
Giovanni 2002 Partner - Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Prezioso
Brian 2006 Partner - Latham Watkins LLP
Cartwright
David M. 2009 Partner - Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Becker
MarkD. Cahn 2011 Deputy General Counsel - SEC;
Partner - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Door
LLP
Anne K. Small 2013 Special Assistant to the President & Associate
Counsel to the President - White House Counsel's
Office;
Deputy General Counsel for Litigation and
Adjudication - SEC
Robert Sebbins 2017 Partner - Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
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B. SEC DIVISION HEADS (CORPORATION FINANCE)
Director of Corporation Finance 8 1
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
1934-1954
Baldwin B. 1934 Executive Administrator of the Examination Division
Bane - SEC
Byron 1952 Assistant Deputy Administrator for Resources
Woodside Expansion - National Securities Resources Board &
Defense Production Administration;
Member - Army Decartelization Commission, Japan
1955-1975
Manuel 1960 Chief Counsel of Corporation Finance - SEC
Cohen
Edmund 1962 Assistant Director of Administrative Proceedings,
Worthy Investigations and Branch of Small Issues, Division of
Corporation Finance - SEC
Charles 1969 Chief Counsel of Corporation Finanace - SEC
Shreve
Alan 1970 A mutual fund in California;
Levenson Attorney, Branch of Administrative Proceedings and
Investigation, Division of Corporation Finance - SEC
1976-1996
Richard 1976 Head of Administrative Proceedings and Investigation,
Rowe Division of Corporation Finance - SEC
Edward F. 1979 Deputy Director of Corporation Finance - SEC;
Greene Partner - Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
Lee B. 1982 Deputy Director of Corporate Finance - SEC;
Spencer Jr. Associate Director of Investment Management - SEC
John J. 1984 Deputy Director of Corporation Finance - SEC
Huber
285. Until 1942, this division was called the Registration Division. See Records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission [SEC], NAT'L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/
groups/266.html [https://perma.cc/4EPR-YQGD] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
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Director of Corporation Finance...
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
Linda 1986 Executive Assistant to the Chair - SEC;
Quinn Associate Director of Corporation Finance - SEC
Brian Lane 1996 Legal Counsel to SEC Commissioner & SEC Chair -
SEC
1997-2017
David 1999 Partner - Hogan & Hartson LLP
Martin
Alan Beller 2002 Partner - Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
John W. 2006 Partner - Cravath Swaine Moore LLP
White
Meredith 2009 Partner - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Cross
Keith 2013 Partner - Ropes & Gray LLP
Higgins
William H. 2017 Partner - Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
Hinman
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C. SEC DIVISION HEADS (TRADING AND MARKETS)
Director of Trading and Markets 86
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
1934-1954
David 1934 Assistant Counsel - Senate Committee on Banking &
Saperstein Currency
Ganson 1937 Assistant Director of Trading and Markets - SEC
Purcell
James 1941 Assistant Director of Trading and Markets - SEC
Treanor
Edward 1948 Chief Counsel of Corporation Finance - SEC
Cashion
Anthon H. 1950 Associate Director of Trading and Markets - SEC
Lund
Harold 1954 Partner - Auchincloss, Parker and Redpath
Patterson
1955-1975
Philip A. 1955 Associate Director of Trading and Exchanges - SEC
Loomis, Jr.
Ralph S. 1963 Associate Director of Trading and Markets - SEC
Saul
Irving 1965 Associate Director of Trading and Markets - SEC;
Pollack Staff Attorney, Office of the General Counse - SEC
Lee Pickard 1973 Special Counsel to the Chair - SEC;
Associate - Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander,
& Mitchel;
Associate - Seward & Kissel LLP
286. See About the Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.
gov/tm/Article/mrabout.html [https://perma.cc/VPR8-TV6B] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019). This Division
has also been called "Trading and Exchange," "Trading and Exchanges," and "Market Regulation."
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Director of Trading and Markets 86
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
1976-1996
Andrew 1977 Special Counsel of Market Regulation - SEC;
Klein Small security law firm
Douglas 1979 Associate Director of Market Regulation - SEC;
Scarff Assistant Director of Market Structure and Trading
Practices - SEC
Richard 1984 Associate Director of Market Structure - SEC
Ketchum
William H. 1991 Managing Director & Head of Arbitrage Department -
Heyman Smith Barney (now part of Morgan Stanley Wealth
Management)
Brandon 1993 Deputy Director of Market Regulation - SEC
Becker
Richard 1996 Chief Economist - SEC;
Lindsey Assistant Professor of Finance - Yale School of
Management
1997-2017
Annette L. 1999 Senior Counsel to Chair & Interim Director of
Nazareth Investment Management - SEC;
Managing Director- Smith Barney (now part of
Morgan Stanley Wealth Management)
Eric Sirri 2006 Visiting Scholar - Harvard Law School;
Associate Professor - Babson College
Robert 2009 Partner - Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Cook
Stephen 2014 Partner - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Doff LLP;
Luparello Vice Chair - FINRA
Brett 2017 Global Head of Market Structure - J.P. Morgan;
Redfearn Global Head of Equity Market Structure Strategy -
J.P. Morgan;
Americas Head of Market Structure Strategy - J.P.
Morgan
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D. SEC DIVISION HEADS (CORPORATE REGULATION)
Director of Corporate Regulation28 7
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
Robert 1952 Insufficient Information Available
McDowell
1955-1975
Ray Garrett, Jr. 1956 Associate Director of Corporate Regulation
- SEC;
Partner - Gardner, Carton, Douglas, Roemer &
Chilgren
Joseph C. 1957 Associate Director of Corporate Regulation
Woodle - SEC;
Lecturer - University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law;
Partner - Nields & Woodle
Alan F. 1961 General Counsel - SEC;
Conwill Partner - Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
Solomon 1964 Associate Director of Corporate Regulation - SEC
Freedman
Aaron Levy 1972 Associate Director of Corporate Regulation - SEC
287. This division existed from 1952 to 1972. See Securities and Exchange Commission Division of
Corporate Regulation, Division Directors, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N HISiT. Soc'Y, http://
3197d6dl4b5fl9f2f440-5el3d29c4cOl6cf96cbbfdl97c579b45.r81.cfl.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/
1930/1936_1983_SECDivCorpR_DD.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
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E. SEC DIVISION HEADS (INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT)
Investment Management288
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
Allan Mostoff 1972 Special Counsel of Corporate Regulation - SEC
1976-1996
Anne Jones 1976 Associate Director of Investment Management - SEC
Sydney 1978 Associate Director of Investment Management - SEC;
Mendelsohn Assistant Director of Investment Management - SEC
Joel 1980 Associate Director of Investment Management - SEC
Goldberg
Kathryn 1983 Counsel - Gardner, Carton & Douglas LLP;
McGrath Associate Director of Market Regulation - SEC
Marianne K. 1990 Associate Director of Investment Management - SEC;
Smythe Executive Assistant to the Chair - SEC
Barry 1993 Partner - Willkie Farr & Gallagher;
Barbash Staff Attorney of Investment Management - SEC;
Staff Attorney, Office of the Solicitor - Department of Labor
1997-2017
Paul Roye 1998 Partner - Dechert LLP;
Staff Attorney of Investment Management - SEC
Andrew 2006 Global General Counsel - Merrill Lynch Investment
Donohue Managers;
Executive Vice President and General Counsel -
Oppenheimer-Funds Inc.
Eileen 2011 Partner and Chief Investment Officer - Goldman
Rominger Sachs Asset Management;
Managing Director and Member of the Executive
Committee - Oppenheimer Capital
Norm 2012 Deputy Director, Office of Compliance Inspections
Champ and Examinations - SEC
David Grim 2015 Deputy Director of Investment Management - SEC;
Assistant Chief Counsel - SEC
288. This was a part of the Division of Corporate Regulation until 1972. See Panelist Bios for 75th
Anniversary of the 1940 Acts, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/75/75th-anniversary-iac-ica-bios.shtml [https://perma.cc/PX63-WTKR]. This was called the
Division of Investment Management Regulation until 1975. See id.
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F. SEC DIVISION HEADS (ENFORCEMENT)
Director of Enforcement...
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
1955-1975
Irving Pollack 1972 Director of Trading and Markets - SEC
Stanley 1974 Deputy Director of Enforcement - SEC;
Sporkin Associate Director of Enforcement - SEC;
Assistant Director of Enforcement - SEC
1976-1996
John Fedders 1981 Partner - Arnold & Porter LLP
Gary Lynch 1985 Associate Director of Enforcement - SEC
William R. 1989 Associate Director of Enforcement - SEC
McLucas
1997-2017
Richard 1998 General Counsel - SEC;
Walker Regional Director of the Northeast Regional Office -
SEC
Stephen Cutler 2001 Deputy Director of Enforcement - SEC;
Partner - Wilmer Cutler & Pickering & Doff LLP
Linda 2005 Deputy Director of Enforcement - SEC;
Chatman Associate Director of Enforcement - SEC;
Thomsen Assistant Director of Enforcement - SEC
Robert 2009 General Counsel of Americas - Deutsche Bank
Khuzami
Andrew 2013 Partner / Co-Chair of White Collar & Regulatory
Ceresney Defense - Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
Stephanie 2017 Deputy Director of Enforcement - SEC;
Avakian Partner - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Doff LLP
Steven Peikin 2017 Partner - Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
289. Created in 1972. See Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.
gov/page/enforcement-section-landing [https://perma.cc/5A2V-BFTB] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
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G. SEC DIVISION HEADS (ECONOMIC AND RISK ANALYSIS)
Director of Economic & Risk Analysis/Chief Economist 90
Name Appointed Posts Before Appointment
Henry Hu 2009 Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance -
University of Texas Law School
Craig 2011 Economic Fellow - SEC;
Lewis Madison S. Wigginton Professor of Finance, Owen
Graduate School of Management - Vanderbilt
University
Mark 2014 Professor - University of Florida;
Flannery Member and Chair, Model Validation Council - Federal
Reserve
Jeffrey H. 2017 Professor and Gary D. Cohn Goldman Sachs Chair in
Harris Finance, Kogod School of Business - American
University
290. This Division was founded in 2009. The Division is also called the Division of Risk, Strategy,
and Financial Innovation. See Economic and Risk Analysis: About the Division, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/dera [https://perma.cc/3FUW-XY6K] (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
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APPENDIX II: SEC CHAIRS OVER TIME
(Revolver Appointments in Italics; Prior Appointment as SEC Commissioner
Indicated by +; Prior Appointment with SEC Staff Noted by Bold Face Type)
Historical Summary of SEC Chairs 9 '
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment
Joseph P. 7/2/34 9/23/35 7/2/34 9/23/35 Engaged in
Kennedy investment.2 9 2
James M. 7/2/34 9/15/37 9/23/35 9/15/37 Member of the
Landis+ Federal Trade
Commission. 2 93
William 0. 1/31/36 4/16/39 9/21/37 4/16/39 Faculty at Yale Law
Douglas+ School.294
Jerome N. 12/27/37 4/30/41 5/18/39 4/9/41 In private practice
Frank+ with the firm of
Greenbaum, Wolff
and Ernst.295
Edward C. 12/3/38 2/2/42 4/9/41 1/20/42 Congressman,
Eicher+ United States House
of Representatives,
1933-1938.296
291. A list of former Chairs of the Security and Exchange Commission can be found at SEC
Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.
gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm [https://perma.cc/N3PB-4CUV] (last modified May 4, 2017).
292. Joseph P. Kennedy, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, https://www.
jfklibrary.org/JFK/The-Kennedy-Family/Joseph-P-Kennedy.aspx [https://perma.cc/X7DA-AYYA] (last
visited Oct. 8, 2018).
293. Commissioners, Chairwomen and Chairmen of the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/commissioners/commissionerchart08312018.
pdf (last modified May 2018).
294. William 0. Douglas Biography, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people/william-o-
douglas-9278209 [https://perma.cc/ XF5T-8YF9] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
295. Guide to the Jerome New Frank Papers, YALE UNIv. LIBRARY, http://drs.library.yale.edu/
HLTransformer/HLTransSerlet?stylename=yul.ead2002.xhtml.xsl&pidemssa:ms.0222&clear-stylesheet-
cache=yes [https://perma.cc/K96F-3GZK] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
296. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: Eicher, Edward Clayton, (1878-1944),
BIOGUIDE.CONGRESS.GOV, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000094 [https://
perma.cc/F569-YUBB] (last visited Oct 8, 2018).
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297. Letter from Joseph P. Kennedy, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to James P. Buchanan, Chair,
Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 14, 1935), http://3197d6dl4b5f
19f2f440-5el3d29c4c016cf96cbbfdl97c579b45.r81.cfl.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1930/1935_01
14_JPKtoBuchananljt.pdf.
298. James J. Caffrey Heads Regional Office of SEC, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1938), https://www.
nytimes.com/1938/05/03/archives/james-j-caffrey-heads-regional-office-of-sec.html?smid=pl- [https://
nyti.ms/2C9taaG].
299. New Face for SEC, TIME (July 8, 1946), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,
778761,00.html [https://perma.cc/68XS-SPRS].
300. Harry McDonald Ex-U.S. Aide, Dies; Former Chairman of SEC Also Headed the RFC, N.Y.
TIMES (July 4, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/04/archives/harry-mdonald-exus-aide-dies-
former-chairman-of-sec-also-headed-the.html?smid=pl-share&mtrref=undefined&gwh=5597 1994
F7D43796FBC7FE039FB10050&gwt=pay [https://nyti.ms/2C9MHaW].
Historical Summary of SEC Chairs 9 '
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment
Ganson 6/17/41 6/30/46 1/20/42 6/30/46 Joined the SEC in
Purcell + 1934. (Need further
information to
confirm) 2 9 7
James J. 5/2/45 12/31/47 7/23/46 12/31/47 Headed the regional




EdmondM. 7/22/46 11/3/49 5/18/48 11/3/49 Partner at the law
Hanrahan- firm of Sullivan,
+ Donovan &
Heenehan.2 9 9
Harry A. 3/26/47 2/25/52 11/4/49 2/25/52 Worked at invest-
McDonald- ment brokerage.3 00
+
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301. William G. Blair, Donald Cook, Ex-Chairman of S.E.C., Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 17,
1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/17/obituaries/donald-cook-ex-chairman-of-sec-dies-at-72.
html [http://nyti.ms/2GKRnEn].
302. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Ralph Dennler, 91, Chairman of the S.E.C. Under Eisenhower, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/29/us/ralph-dennler-91-chairman-of-the-sec-under-
eisenhower.html?smid=pl-share&mtrref=undefined&gwh=F3B8DCFA4E62B332E9353606D49212DE&
gwt=pay [https://nyti.ms/2A46EyD].
303. Douglas Martin, J. Sinclair Armstrong, SEC Chief, Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 9, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/nyregion/j-sinclair-armstrong-sec-chief-dies-at-85.html?smid=
pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2qFJ5HY].
304. News Digest, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 20, 1957), https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/
1957/dig082057.pdf.
Historical Summary of SEC Chairs 2 9
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment










Director of the Office
of Alien Property in
the Justice
Department.30 1
Ralph H. 6/17/53 5/25/55 6/17/53 5/25/55 At the law firm
Demmler Reed Smith Shaw &
McClay.3 0 2
J. Sinclair 7/16/53 6/27/57 5/25/55 6/27/57 Lawyer at the
Armstrong- Chicago firm of
+ Isham, Lincoln &
Beale when named
as commissioner.3 0 3
EdwardN. 8/20/57 8/4/61 8/20/57 3/26/61 Lawyer at Boston
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Historical Summary of SEC Chairs 9 '
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment
William L. 3/27/61 8/21/64 3/27/61 8/20/64 Professor of Law at
Cary Columbia
University.3 0 5
Manuel F. 10/11/61 2/22/69 8/20/64 2/22/69 Joined the SEC staff
Cohen+ in 1942 as a junior at-
torney and stayed
twenty-seven years.30
Hamer H. 7/8/64 1/2/71 2/22/69 1/2/71 Judge in the Third
Budge+ Judicial District of
Idaho in Boise.3 07
William J. 4/14/71 2/2/73 4/14/71 2/2/73 Partner at Hall,
Casey Casey, Dickler &
Howley, a New York
corporate law firm
from 1957-1971.308
G. 3/3/73 5/16/73 3/3/73 5/16/73 General Counsel of





Ray 8/6/73 10/28/75 8/6/73 10/28/75 Partner at Chicago
Garrett, Jr. law firm.310
305. David Margolick, William Carey, Former S.E.C. Chairman, Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/09/obituaries/william-carey-former-sec-chairman-dies-at-72.
html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2CaHsbg].
306. Hobart Rowen, Manuel F. Cohen, Former SEC Head, Dies, WASH. PosT. (June 18, 1977), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1977/06/18/manuel-f-cohen-former-sec-head-dies/63a7bfa3 -bcc6-
4ab0-841d-a0f9c6b20cac/?utmjterm=.el21ca47831f [https://perma.cc/Z6VM-G7GU].
307. Paul Lewis, Hamer Harold Budge, 92; S.E.C. Chief and Lawmaker, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/04/business/hamer-harold-budge-92-sec-chief-and-lawmaker.html?
smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2A4hiWa].
308. Eric Pace, William Casey, Ex-C.I.A. Head Is Dead at 74, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 1987), https://
www.nytimes.com/1987/05/07/obituaries/william-casey-ex-cia-head-is-dead-at-74.html?smid=pl-share
[https://nyti.ms/2EmUFex].
309. Chicagoan is Named Top SEC Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 1971), https://www.nytimes.
com/1 97 1/09/08/archives/chicagoan-is-named-top-sec-counsel.html?smid=pl-share/ [https://nyti.
ms/2A4mUjc].
310. In the Midst of Revolution: The SEC, 1973-1981, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.
sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/rev/rev02a.php [https://perma.cc/2YL8-J4V8] (last visited Oct. 8,
2018).
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Historical Summary of SEC Chairs 9 '
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment
Roderick 10/28/75 4/10/77 10/28/75 4/10/77 Top adviser in the
M. Hills White House.3 1 1
Harold M. 4/18/77 3/1/81 4/18/77 3/1/81 Dean of the UCLA
Williams Anderson School of
Management from
1970.312




during the 1980 elec-
tion; worked in E. F.
Hutton Group, Inc. 313




Richard C. 10/11/89 5/7/93 10/11/89 5/7/93 Served in government




311. Matt Schudel, Roderick M. Hills, Ford White House Official Who Led SEC from 1975 to 1977,




312. Mary Daily, In Memoriam: Harold Williams, Former Dean of UCLA Anderson, Philanthropist
and Arts Advocate, UCLA NEWSROOM (Aug. 1, 2017), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/in-memoriam-
harold-williams-former-dean-of-ucla-anderson-philanthropist-and-arts-advocate [https://perma.cc/
GA36-G2QP].




314. Nathaniel C. Nash, Novice Regulator: David S. Ruder; Seeking Tighter Control Over the
Financial Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/17/business/novice-
regulator-david-s-ruder-seeking-tighter-control-over-financial-markets.html?smid=pl-share [https://
nyti.ms/2A3MG77].
315. Richard C. Breedent, HARV. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/
breeden-bio.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZG3D-B2Q2] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
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Historical Summary of SEC Chairs..'
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment





owner of the Roll
Call
newspaper.3 16
Harvey L. 8/3/01 2/17/03 8/3/01 2/17/03 In the private prac-
Pitt tice of law from
1978 to 2001;
worked at the SEC
from 1968-1978;
the last three years
of which Pitt was the
Commission's
General Counsel.3 17
316. SEC Biography: Chairman Arthur Levitt, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/
about/commissioner/levitt.htm[https://perma.cc/27VM-QQMJ] (last modified Jan. 23, 2009).
317. SEC Biography: Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/
about/commissioner/pitt.htm [https://perma.cc/HD77-U3GL] (last modified Jan. 23, 2009).
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Historical Summary of SEC Chairs2 91
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment
William H. 2/18/03 6/30/05 2/18/03 6/30/05 Worked in business,























Christoph- 8/03/05 1/20/09 8/03/05 1/20/09 Chair of the United




318. SEC Biography: Chairman William H. Donaldson, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.
sec.gov/about/commissioner/donaldson.htm [https://perma.cc/E2D7-QGK6] (last modified Jan. 23,
2009).
319. SEC Biography: Chairman Christopher Cox, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.
gov/about/commissioner/cox.htm [https://perma.cc/AQV9-FADH] (last modified Feb. 4, 2009).
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320. SEC Biography: Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.
gov/about/commissioner/schapiro.htm [https://perma.cc/7JBR-TKVA] (last modified Dec. 11, 2012).
321. Biography: Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/biography/
white-mary-jo [https://perma.cc/MDL2-P44T] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
322. Biography: Chairman Jay Clayton, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/
biography/jay-clayton [https://perma.cc/QEF7-742U] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
Historical Summary of SEC Chairs..'
Chair Commissioner Term Chair Term Experience 18
Months Prior to
Appointment
Mary L. 1/27/09 12/14/12 1/27/09 12/14/12 Chief Executive





Mary Jo 04/10/13 1/20/17 04/10/13 1/20/17 Chair of the litiga-
White tion department at
Debevoise &
Plimpton LLP.3 2 1
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APPENDIX III: SEC CHAIRS AND THEIR GENERAL COUNSELS
(Revolvers in Italics)
SEC Chair General Counsel
Joseph P. Kennedy John J. Burns
1934-1935 1934-1936








Jerome N. Frank Chester T. Lane
1939-1941 1938-1948
Edward C. Eicher Chester T. Lane
1941-1942 1938-1948
Ganson Purcell Chester T. Lane
1942-1946 1938-1948
James J. Caffrey Chester T. Lane
1946-1947 1938-1948




Harry A. McDonald Roger S. Foster
1950-1952 1948-1953
Donald C. Cook Roger S. Foster
1952-1953 1948-1953
Ralph H. Demmler William H. Timbers
1953-1955 1953-1956
J. Sinclair Armstrong Thomas G. Meeker
1955-1957 1956-1960
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SEC Chair General Counsel




William L. Cary Peter A. Dammann
1961-1964 1961-1963
Philip A. Loomis, Jr.
1963-1971
Manuel F. Cohen Philip A. Loomis, Jr.
1964-1969 1963-1971
Hamer H. Budge Philip A. Loomis, Jr.
1969-1971 1963-1971
William J. Casey G. Bradford Cook
1971-1973 1971-1973
G. Bradford Cook Lawrence Nerheim
1973-1973 1973-1975
Ray Garrett, Jr. Lawrence Nerheim
1973-1975 1973-1975
Roderick M. Hills Harvey Pitt
1975-1977 1975-1978
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SEC Chair General Counsel
David S. Ruder Daniel L. Goelzer
1987-1989 1983-1990
















William H. Donaldson Giovanni Prezioso
2003-2005 2002-2006








Mary Jo White Anne K. Small
2013-2017 2012-2017
Jay Clayton Robert Stebbins
2017- 2017-
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